After nearly a decade of discussion, the European Parliament endorsed the long-awaited new migration pact, which was officially approved on April 10, 2024. [1] This major policy reform comes as a response to the refugee’s crisis of 2015, which exposed inequalities in how European countries shared the border management. In fact, the Dublin Regulation, which was designed to assign responsibility for processing asylum applications to the first country of entry, largely failed to function as intended. As a result, countries at the EU’s external borders, such as Italy and Greece, were faced with a disproportionate share of arrivals. Meanwhile, countries like Hungary, which did not receive many arrivals, felt little responsibility to help. In this context, a reform was urgently needed. [2]
The purpose of the Pact on Migration and Asylum is to create a fairer, more efficient, and unified approach to how the European Union handles migration and asylum management. The new set of rules can be divided into four main areas: securing external borders, ensuring fast and efficient procedures, establishing an effective system of solidarity, and enhancing cooperation with third countries along with further externalization. [3] The first three areas are addressed through concrete measures. These include accelerating border procedures within 12 weeks. They also involve implementing strict admissibility checks, including medical and criminal screenings. Another key measure is the establishment of a solidarity mechanism to support frontline EU countries. This analysis, however, focuses on the fourth area: the externalization of borders. This strategy involves strengthened cooperation with third countries. In particular, the EU establishes partnerships with African countries to limit migration and ultimately prevent migrants from reaching European territory. [4] This externalization approach serves two main purposes: first, to restrict migrants’ entry and stay in Europe by preventing their departure from origin or transit countries and by limiting asylum rights; and second, to facilitate their return from the EU to these countries. [5]
Political Context: Brief Overview of the EU’s Border Externalization Strategy
The externalization of EU borders is not a new phenomenon. Since the early 2000s, the EU and individual member states have increasingly relied on partnerships with third countries, particularly in North Africa, to control migration flows beyond EU territory. Following the migration crisis of 2015, triggered by the Syrian civil war and deteriorating security situations in other Maghreb and Middle Eastern countries, one of the most prominent examples of this externalization strategy was the deal with Turkey. The EU pledged €6 billion to Turkey in exchange for preventing Syrian refugees from reaching Greece and Bulgaria. Although the deal largely failed to meet its objectives, the logic of border externalization has continued to expand and now involves a growing number of third countries. [6] In the years after the EU-Turkey agreement, the EU expanded bilateral cooperation with North African countries, notably Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. [7] In Libya, support for the coastguard continued despite documented human rights abuses, while engagement with Tunisia and Morocco intensified through informal deals and targeted funding. The 2018 expansion of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the 2020 New Pact on Migration and Asylum marked key steps toward institutionalizing externalization and coordinating EU-wide return policies. [8]
In line with this logic, the European Commission took a significant step in April–May 2025 by proposing the first common EU list of “safe third countries of return,” which includes Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Georgia, Senegal, and Gambia. While some individual member states had already designated certain countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia, as „safe“ for returns, the introduction of a unified EU list represents a move toward automatic harmonization. [9] However, no evidence has been provided to substantiate that the countries on this list are genuinely safe. In fact, according to a report by the Transnational Institute (TNI), Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Gambia are classified as presenting a high risk in terms of human rights, while Egypt and Pakistan fall under the category of “extreme” human rights risks. [10] By aligning itself with authoritarian regimes in the management of migration, the EU may be seen as compromising the democratic values and human rights principles outlined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Specifically, Article 21 of the TEU states that: “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries […] which share the principles […] it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity.” [11]
This article examines the contradiction in the EU’s approach: on one hand, it seeks to externalize its borders by cooperating with authoritarian regimes to enhance internal security; on the other, this strategy undermines its soft power. Cooperation with such countries creates a gap between the EU’s stated values and its actions. In doing so, we might argue that it legitimizes authoritarian regimes that instrumentalize migrants as tools of political leverage. To explain this contradiction, the article focuses on Morocco and Tunisia, both labeled as “safe countries of origin” for their own nationals seeking asylum. In parallel, the latter also fall under the EU’s “safe third country” classification, meaning that nationals from other countries can be returned there. This dual role, as both origin and transit countries, creates opportunities for their governments to leverage migration for political purposes. The Moroccan government wields it in relation to Western Sahara, while Tunisia’s president uses it to consolidate his authoritarian power.
Focus on Morocco
Morocco plays a central role in the European Union’s migration policy due to its strategic geographic location at the crossroads between sub-Saharan Africa and southern Europe. This position makes the country both a place of origin for some migrants and, more importantly, a major transit hub for sub-Saharan Africans en route to the EU. Migrants typically reach Morocco via two main routes: the trans-Saharan route traverses the desert from various parts of West and Central Africa. Meanwhile, the Atlantic route involves perilous sea crossings from the Moroccan coasts toward the Canary Islands. [12]
Because of this strategic position, Morocco has long been a key partner to the European Union on migration management. Since the early 2000s, the EU has engaged in close cooperation with Moroccan authorities. This relationship deepened in 2013 with the signing of the Mobility Partnership Agreement and the EU’s support for Morocco’s National Strategy on Migration and Asylum. Between 2014 and 2020, the EU allocated around €1.5 billion to bilateral cooperation, much of it aimed at managing migration, through instruments such as the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. This support continued between 2021 and 2022 with an additional €631 million under the Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), alongside funding from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). As a result, Morocco’s role as a gatekeeper of the EU’s external borders has grown considerably. [13]
Initially, Morocco was seen as a political partner, with cooperation serving as an indirect means for the EU to promote its democratic values. However, over time, migration pressure shifted the balance of power. The kingdom began to instrumentalize migrants as a form of political leverage, using its control over migration flows to extract economic benefits and diplomatic concessions from the EU. [14]
One notable example of Morocco exerting diplomatic pressure on the EU involves the dispute over Western Sahara. In brief, Western Sahara is a contested territory claimed by Morocco but challenged by the Sahrawi independence movement, the Polisario Front, which receives political and logistical support from Algeria. While Morocco controls most of the territory and advocates for autonomy under its sovereignty, Algeria supports the Polisario and hosts Sahrawi refugees. In May 2021, Morocco leveraged migration by easing its border controls and allowing around 8,000 migrants to enter the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. This move was a response to Spain’s decision to host the leader of the Polisario Front for medical treatment, which Morocco perceived as a diplomatic affront. After that incident, Spain officially endorsed Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara in March 2022, bilateral cooperation resumed, and Moroccan authorities reinforced border controls. [15] This episode exemplifies a broader mechanism in which migration is used as a tool to exert political pressure on the EU. By doing so, it limits the EU’s capacity to make decisions independently.
After illustrating how Morocco can leverage migration for political concession on the EU, it is important to examine how this strategy affects border management and the human consequences for migrants. The cooperation between Morocco and the EU, in this case Spain, is based on the European border security model. It allows the EU to frame migration as a security threat. At the core of this cooperation is the dismantling of smuggling networks and the prevention of human trafficking. To this end, Spain and Morocco maintain a coordinated maritime security framework, with each country responsible for search and rescue (SAR) operations in its designated zones (Spain through Salvamento Marítimo and the Civil Guard, and Morocco via the Royal Gendarmerie). [16]
The problem with this security-based approach is that efforts are directed almost exclusively toward border control and crime prevention, leaving limited space for the protection of refugees and migrants. Moreover, it often obscures the distinction between human trafficking, smuggling, and migration undertaken in search of a better life. As a consequence of this intense securitization of borders, in 2024 alone, over 10,457 people died or went missing while trying to reach Spain, a 58% increase compared to 2023 (Caminando Fronteras). In this context, “success” is primarily measured by reductions in the number of arrivals to Europe, while the human needs and rights of those crossing borders are largely neglected. [17][18]
In fact, many of the deaths recorded in 2024 stem from harsh conditions faced by migrants in Morocco, where safe and legal routes to protection are systematically denied. With few alternatives, many are forced to risk dangerous sea crossings to escape violence and insecurity. [19] This erosion of migrant rights goes hand in hand with a broader democratic decline: according to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2024 Democracy Index, Morocco’s score dropped from 5.52 in 2006 to 5.17, placing it 91st out of 167 countries, a clear sign of its drift toward authoritarian governance. [20] Despite the alarming figures, the European Union has nonetheless classified the country as a “safe third country” under the new Migration Pact signed in 2024. [21]
However, as highlighted by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) and many other institutions, there are no clear indicators of progress in human rights in Morocco that could justify its designation as a “safe” country. In reality, Morocco fails to guarantee the fundamental rights of migrants and refugees on its territory. Many are forced to live in precarious and unsafe conditions, often facing violence, limited access to essential services, and inadequate legal protection. Furthermore, Morocco’s Law 02-03 on migration has been widely criticized for permitting detentions without trial and expulsions without proper legal recourse, raising serious concerns about the country’s respect for migrant rights. [22] Although Morocco, ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, it has not implemented the necessary legal or institutional infrastructure to process asylum claims. As a result, responsibility for asylum is delegated to international organizations such as the UNHCR and the IOM, limiting the oversight of Morocco and the EU. [23]
Focus on Tunisia
As with the Moroccan case, Tunisia also has a longstanding migration partnership with the UE. Its location on the eastern side of North Africa makes it another key player in curbing irregular migration along the Central Trans-Saharan route. This route begins in the Sahel (Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso), with migrants crossing the Sahara, often via Agadez in Niger, before heading toward Libya or Tunisia. Increasingly, Tunisia is used as a transit point by those seeking to avoid Libya’s instability and widespread abuses. [24] Due to its geographic proximity to Europe, Tunisia has long enjoyed a privileged status in its relationship with the European Union. It was the first country in the EU’s Southern Neighborhood to formalize ties through an Association Agreement in 1995. This relationship deepened in 2012 with the signing of a Privileged Partnership. Uniquely, Tunisia is also the only African or Arab country included in the EU’s Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe research programs. The partnerships between the two are further characterized by substantial financial support from the EU to Tunisia, amounting to over €2 billion. [25]
Despite this deep cooperation, a turning point came in 2021 with President d’s democratic breakdown, which marked a clear shift toward authoritarianism. This move led to the dissolution of independent institutions such as the parliament, judiciary, and election commission, which were replaced by figures loyal to Saïed. He later consolidated power through a new constitution that granted him sweeping executive authority. In parallel, he curtailed freedom of expression through repressive laws targeting dissent. In response to this authoritarian drift, many traditional donors (IMF, World Bank) withdrew from their partnerships with Tunisia. Nevertheless, the European Union continued its financial cooperation with the country. [26]
Despite this, in 2023, the European Union and Tunisia signed a Memorandum of Understanding primarily focused on managing migration flows. This cooperation framework is characterized by an almost complete absence of conditions related to respect for human rights or the promotion of democratic norms, combined with substantial financial support: immediate aid of €105 million to strengthen the Tunisian coastguard and border management, alongside proposals for €900 million in macroeconomic support and €150 million in direct budgetary assistance. [27] This ongoing engagement is largely driven by Italy, the EU member state most directly impacted by irregular migration from Tunisia, particularly toward the island of Lampedusa. In 2023, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani explicitly called on Tunisia to step up its efforts to curb irregular migration and facilitate deportations. [28]
Finally, under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum (2024), Tunisia, much like Morocco, has been designated as a “safe third country.” However, this designation has sparked significant criticism from human rights organizations. EuroMed Rights, for instance, condemned the EU’s decision, especially in light of Tunisia’s ongoing democratic backsliding and frequent reports of abuse against migrants. The classification was announced during the same week as a mass trial widely denounced by international observers, highlighting the political dissonance of such a decision. [29]
Human rights organizations have documented widespread abuses at the country’s borders, including rape, beatings, forced removals, and dangerous maritime interception practices that put lives at risk. Between November 2023 and April 2024, reports pointed to a sharp increase in sexual violence, human trafficking, and enforced disappearances targeting refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, under President Kaïs Saïed’s, xenophobic rhetoric has intensified, with migrants, particularly sub-Saharan Africans, portrayed as part of a plot to alter Arab and Muslim Tunisia’s demographic identity. [30]
Tunisia’s engagement in the EU migration partnership is not merely passive. Although Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed’s officially rejects the idea of border externalization, insisting that Tunisia will not become Europe’s border guard or a resettlement country for deported migrants, he continues to engage in migration negotiations with the EU. This apparent contradiction reveals a strategic calculation: Tunisia actively leverages migration pressure to gain political legitimacy and substantial financial support, all without implementing democratic reforms. In doing so, the Tunisian president turns migration into a bargaining tool, using it to strengthen his authoritarian control. [31]
Does the Externalization of Borders Work?
As demonstrated throughout this analysis, the EU has long prioritized a realpolitik approach over its democratic values in shaping its migration policies with third countries such as Morocco and Tunisia. Since the 2015 refugee crisis, the EU, driven by a fear of uncontrolled immigration, has adopted a course of containment that includes reforms to asylum law, partnerships with neighboring countries, and now the classification of safe third countries of origin. [32] But one must ask, does the human cost and the damage to the EU’s moral credibility ultimately make the externalization of borders worth it?
While EU cooperation has recently focused on countries like Morocco and Tunisia, earlier efforts targeted Libya. Early EU agreements with Libya, including support for the Libyan coastguard, aimed to block migration via the Central Mediterranean. However, these efforts triggered a classic “waterbed effect”: as repression intensified along Libya’s coast, migration flows shifted toward Tunisia. It means that rather than reducing overall migration, EU externalization strategies have merely shifted routes, forcing migrants and smugglers to adapt. Tunisia has since emerged as a key departure point, illustrating how restrictive policies in one region can create unintended pressure in another, without addressing the structural drivers of migration. In 2016, the peak of departures originated in Libya, with approximately 163,000 arrivals compared to just 548 from Tunisia. By 2023, the trend has completely reversed: the number of departures from Tunisia is now more than double that of Libya, which makes Tunisia one of the current top departure countries. This demonstrates how taking restrictive measures on one front simply displaces the problem elsewhere. [33]
Finally, this policy shift has had significant side effects, notably prompting smugglers and traffickers to redirect their operations from Libya to Tunisia, a shift driven by differences in enforcement intensity and migration control between the two countries. While Libyan smuggling routes are dominated by armed militias and deeply criminalized trafficking systems, Tunisia’s smaller, more fragmented market is increasingly exploited by sub-Saharan intermediaries operating out of coastal towns like Zarzis and Sfax. The rise of self-smuggling among Tunisians has made departures more decentralized, unpredictable, and, in many cases, more dangerous, with frequent reports of fatalities. This evolving dynamic complicates monitoring efforts and weakens any state or international oversight over migration flows.[34]
Ultimately, some experts argue that externalization is a short-term strategy with long-term consequences. While this paper has examined the humanitarian impacts of this policy, especially in Morocco and Tunisia, it also shows how relying on authoritarian regimes undermines the EU’s credibility as a promoter of democratic values. This credibility loss extends beyond image: it weakens the EU’s ability to shape regional norms, promote democratic values, and maintain trust among civil society actors in third countries. In cases like Morocco, the EU’s concessions, such as diplomatic support in the Western Sahara dispute, suggest a shift from influencing to being influenced. Many other side effects accompany this strategy, including the polarization of public opinion, the rise of xenophobia across Europe, and increasing fragmentation within the European Union itself. Countries such as Italy, Spain, and Greece are disproportionately affected, bearing a greater burden and often holding divergent views on migration policy. One of the most significant risks to European security is therefore internal: border externalization, by encouraging unilateral action and transactional diplomacy, undermines cohesion among EU member states. For these reasons, many experts argue that EU funding should be redirected toward tackling the root causes of migration by investing in countries of origin to support economic development, democratic governance, and civil society. This would offer a more sustainable solution than merely outsourcing responsibility to third countries, often at great humanitarian and political cost. [35]
Article reviewed by Veronika Zwiefelhofer Čáslavová and Martin Machorek
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