Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exposed deep vulnerabilities in Germany’s energy system. The resulting Zeitenwende marked a declared break with past German behavior and initiated efforts to reconfigure Germany’s long-standing energy model. Now, more than three years later, this article assesses how far Germany has decoupled from Russian energy and whether these steps have truly improved energy security or simply replaced one set of risks with another.
Germany’s energy strategy was long shaped by the principle of Wandel durch Handel (change through trade), [1] the centuries-old liberal idea that trade fosters peace and political convergence. [2] [3] [4] This belief supported close engagement with Russia, especially in the energy sector. Russia’s invasion in 2022 challenged these beliefs, prompting Chancellor Scholz’s landmark Zeitenwende (watershed moment) speech and a declared break with past German positions, [5] making energy a key strategic issue in Germany’s political debate.
Germany’s approach to energy has always been a balancing act between energy security, economic resilience, and climate goals, within a fragmented EU governance framework. [6] Three years after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, energy security remains critical, as recent events underline. Renewed calls by some German politicians for the resumption of Russian gas imports demonstrate that the relationship between Germany and Russia, especially in the trading and energy domain, is not ultimately resolved. [7] The major power outage in Southern Europe has put energy security right at the center of the political agenda again. [8] At the same time, the general uncertainty surrounding the second Trump presidency and what this means for international partnerships and cooperation [9] [10] highlight the need to examine where Germany stood in terms of its energy security, what it has accomplished, and what else might be necessary to do.
Energy Dependency Before the Invasion
As a resource-scarce country, Germany relied on energy imports for more than two-thirds of its primary energy consumption in 2021. [11] Its only significant domestic resources were renewables and lignite. Imports mainly consisted of natural gas, petroleum, and hard coal, [12] together covering about two-thirds of Germany’s total primary energy consumption, [13] with Russia serving as the primary supplier for all three. [14]
In February 2022, Germany was highly vulnerable because Russian fuels were essential for electricity, transportation, industry, and household heating. [15] Oil and coal offered more flexibility due to maritime import options and existing domestic lignite capacity, but Germany heavily relied on natural gas imports. Around half of all gas imports came from Russia, [16] delivered solely via pipelines under long-term contracts, leaving little flexibility. [17] Back then, Germany lacked the infrastructure, especially liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, that could have allowed for alternative maritime sources. [18] This dependence was most evident before the winter of 2022, when, due to low gas storage levels, [19] there were fears that prices for heating, electricity, and fuel would surge, and that parts of Germany’s energy-intensive industry might face shutdowns due to gas shortages. [20]
Handling the Crisis
After Russian gas flows stopped entirely by August 2022, [21] Germany quickly took appropriate measures to avoid an energy crisis. On the supply side, LNG quickly became the cornerstone of diversification efforts. With no prior LNG infrastructure, Germany leased Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs), [22] with the first terminal operational by December 2022, [23] fast-tracked by the LNG-Beschleunigungsgesetz (LNG acceleration act) passed in May. [24] Germany also secured deals with partners from the Middle East and the United States, [25] and increased pipeline gas imports from Norway, which played a crucial role in replacing Russian supplies. [26]
To stabilize the market and prevent broader economic fallout, the government nationalized key gas firms such as Uniper and SEFE, [27] [28] and imposed higher mandatory gas storage levels to reduce the risk of shortages during the winter period. [29] It postponed the planned nuclear phase-out [30] and temporarily reactivated coal-fired plants, [31], a controversial decision in the face of acute supply shortages.
Additionally, a national campaign encouraged voluntary reductions in energy use. [32] [33] With more measures taken, besides the previously mentioned, Germany’s short-term response involved an extraordinary breadth of interventions, often in coordination with EU-level initiatives.
Changing the Structure
In parallel with short-term emergency measures, Germany implemented long-term reforms to ensure future energy stability and security. The April 2022 Osterpaket (Easter package) legislation prioritized renewable energy not only to combat climate change, but also to reduce imports. The legislation elevated the importance of renewable energy as a critical matter of public interest and emphasized the expansion of photovoltaic systems, wind farms, and storage capacities, while accelerating permitting and grid connections. [34]
The energy transition envisioned in the Osterpaket requires major upgrades to the electricity system. Increased reliance on more volatile renewable sources demands a more modern, flexible, and resilient grid. To address this, the Strommarktdesign der Zukunft strategy (electricity market design of the future) was presented to expand transmission capacity, promote digitalization, and support technologies such as battery storage, smart meters, and heat pumps, supported by targeted subsidies. This strategy also covers reforms to the electricity market structures and creates investment conditions suitable for a renewable-dominated system. [35]
Natural gas continues to play a transitional role. Germany is constructing permanent LNG terminals in addition to existing FSRUs, with infrastructure designed to handle hydrogen and ammonia. [36] These developments were accompanied by long-term supply contracts with partners like Norway and Qatar, [37] [38] while Germany also backed EU efforts for joint gas purchasing and coordinated storage obligations. [39]
Hydrogen has gained strategic relevance as a low-carbon gas substitute. The Nationale Wasserstoffstrategie (National hydrogen strategy), updated in 2023, raised domestic electrolysis targets and emphasized infrastructure development. [40] A national hydrogen core network is planned, combining already existing gas pipelines and the construction of new pipelines, to support industrial decarbonization and to be connected to the rest of Europe. [41] [42]
New energy policy strategies have expanded beyond domestic adjustments and simple LNG procurement. Emphasis is placed on long-term partnerships with countries in the Middle East and Africa, as well as with countries like Chile and Australia. These partnerships include hydrogen cooperation, infrastructure projects, technology transfers, and possible access to critical raw materials, thereby aligning energy security more closely with industrial and foreign policy objectives. [6] [43]
Less Russian Risks, More Global Risks
Since February 2022, Germany has rapidly diversified its energy sourcing countries, expanded relevant infrastructure, and was able to reduce its primary energy consumption as well as gas imports significantly. [44] These efforts reduced Germany’s reliance on Russia. However, despite decreasing direct dependence on Russian gas pipelines, Germany’s overall dependency on energy imports remains substantial, and Russian LNG still finds its way to Germany via other European states. [45] Germany still relies on global energy markets for fossil fuels, [46] and despite efforts to boost domestic renewable energy, the country’s long-term energy security is still highly connected to international markets and the volatility they present.
The diversification of sourcing countries has mitigated certain risks, but it has also introduced new geopolitical vulnerabilities. Alternative energy suppliers, notably from the Middle East and the United States, carry their distinct geopolitical risks. The Middle East, a vital region for LNG supplies, remains highly volatile, as tensions in critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz [47] or targeted attacks on energy infrastructure [48] could disrupt energy flows. The United States has become a key LNG supplier for Europe, but Germany should avoid over-reliance, given strained German-American relations under Trump. Even though Trump supports LNG exports, his stance can shift quickly, and he often links unrelated issues like trade and defense spending in dealings with allies. [49] Dependence on U.S. LNG should therefore be managed cautiously within a broader diversification strategy. Additionally, Germany’s growing reliance on Norwegian pipeline gas adds another layer of vulnerability, considering Norway’s own security threats, particularly from Russia. [50] As pipelines are susceptible to sabotage or accidents, [51] this could disrupt supply and complicate Germany’s energy security further.
Other new suppliers from the Middle East or Africa might not be hostile towards Germany, but many are not traditional allies either. Relationships with these countries must be developed or improved in the first place to ensure sustainable, long-term partnerships. This can again lead to conflicts when German interests collide with its values and international norms.
Such shifts in energy security also interact with the earlier mentioned interplay of balancing energy security, economic stability, with environmental goals. While Germany has avoided the immediate energy crises, the gas supply shortages and costs associated with securing new energy supplies, particularly through LNG, have driven up prices, especially in 2022 and early 2023, [52] contributing to the recession that Germany has faced for the last years. [53] The transition to renewable energy, though crucial to Germany’s climate goals and energy security, requires extensive investments in infrastructure and backup capacities to intermittency associated with renewable sources like wind and solar, posing additional long-term economic and logistical challenges.
Balancing Domestic Progress and Global Partnership
Ultimately, it can be said that the picture has changed in some respects but less so in others. Germany was able to switch to other energy suppliers and to heavily decouple from Russia. Nowadays, Germany’s energy comes from increased domestic renewable energy production and intensified existing partnerships with reliable partners like Norway, possibly less reliable United States, and newly established partners from the Middle East and Northern Africa, mainly Qatar, with whom sustainable relationships will have to be developed over time.
Therefore, Germany’s overall energy security has improved, but new vulnerabilities have emerged, particularly geopolitical risks tied to its diversification efforts. Although the immediate crisis has been managed, the long-term stability of Germany’s energy supply depends on its ability to navigate complex international dynamics while balancing the tradeoffs of security, economics, and climate goals. The ongoing transition to renewables is crucial to reducing dependency on fossil fuels, since other energy resources are not locally available and imports are always subject to external developments like conflicts or other crises. But the integration of more renewables into the energy system poses energy security challenges of its own, particularly regarding grid reliability and storage. Coordination with other European nations can help stabilize the European energy supply system, making sure that supply disruptions in one region do not have ripple effects across Europe.
Since domestic or even European energy autonomy will take time, Germany must, besides pushing for more renewables, also work on establishing closer strategic partnerships with its current energy suppliers, particularly in regions like the Middle East, where geopolitical instability can threaten supply. This means going beyond current simple diversification efforts. Deeper ties should be built that are not only based on energy investments but also intensified diplomatic, scientific, and cultural exchange to foster Germany’s soft power stance. As the recent experience with Russia demonstrated, reliance on a single supplier or region without sufficient leverage poses considerable risks. Thus, Germany must proactively shape long-term strategies that guarantee reliable and secure access to energy sources.
Article reviewed by Dávid Dinič and Kryštof Tesař
References
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