Over the past decade, Yemen has experienced turmoil, internal conflict, and external military interventions, resulting in a highly complex and multilayered crisis. Over time, the country has become the battleground for three overlapping conflicts. What began in 2014 as a civil war between the Shia Islamist movement of Houthis and the internationally recognized government of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi quickly escalated into a proxy war between regional powers. The countries involved in the hostilities are Saudi Arabia, backing the Hadi government, and Iran, militarily supporting the Houthis. Other actors such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also played significant roles in shaping the course of the war. More recently, in 2023, the crisis was further complicated by the regional spillover of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, drawing Yemen’s war into broader Middle Eastern tensions. The following analysis focuses on current and past peacebuilding efforts, particularly those led by the United Nations and Oman. [1][2]
The United Nations has made repeated attempts to establish peace in Yemen, ranging from ceasefire negotiations to political dialogue. However, these efforts have largely failed to produce a lasting resolution. The first prominent initiative was the 2013 National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which aimed to create a federal state through an inclusive dialogue. [3] Nevertheless, instead of uniting the country, the NDC deepened existing divisions. Following this initial failed UN peacebuilding effort, a persistent lack of trust towards UN initiatives emerged. [4]
While several factors contributed to the failure of peacebuilding in Yemen, this article argues that one key reason for the UN’s limited effectiveness is the lack of trust in the institution by the country’s main political actors. The dynamics of mediation evolved further in 2022, when Oman re-emerged as a significant actor in peace negotiations. By playing a pivotal role in facilitating dialogue between conflicting parties, Oman’s involvement signalled a broader shift from internationally-led initiatives towards regionally-led negotiations. This development reflects a redistribution of diplomatic influence, making the question of trust central to the peacebuilding process. [5]
Before delving into the challenges of international peacebuilding in Yemen, it is essential to revisit the historical context that has shaped this conflict.
Historical Roots of Yemen’s Current Conflict
The instability in Yemen began well before the outbreak of the war we know today. In 1990, the unification of North and South Yemen into the Republic of Yemen was marked by deep tribal, sectarian, and regional divisions. These long-standing fractures made it difficult for the government to build a cohesive national identity and maintain law and order. [6]
After the 1994 civil war, President Ali Abdullah Saleh consolidated power and ruled the country. During this period, the Houthis emerged, responding to socioeconomic and political marginalization under Saleh’s regime. Associated with a religious movement, they have since sought international recognition as a legitimate political authority in Yemen. Taking advantage of the central government’s limited presence in Saada, their northern stronghold, the Houthis gradually expanded their influence. This local dominance paved the way for their transformation in 2005 from a grassroots movement into an armed insurgency directly challenging Saleh’s authority. [4]
Despite the opposition rallying behind an alternative candidate in the 2006 elections, Saleh remained in power, exacerbating public discontent. This growing frustration culminated in the 2011 Arab Spring, when widespread protests, including those led by the Houthis, demanded Saleh’s resignation. Saleh stepped down peacefully, transferring power to his vice president, Abd-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. [7] However, President Hadi also faced challenges to his legitimacy. In 2014, mass protests erupted after the removal of fuel subsidies. Taking advantage of the unrest, the Houthis allied with forces loyal to former president Saleh and advanced from their northern stronghold to seize Sana’a, the capital. As they gained ground, president Hadi was forced into exile in Saudi Arabia. [5]
In March 2015, a coalition of Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia and backed by U.S. logistical and intelligence support, began a campaign of airstrikes and economic isolation against the Houthi insurgency. The purpose was to restore President Hadi to power, as he was politically aligned with Saudi Arabia. [8] The Arab coalition also opposes the Houthis due to their military backing from Iran, a regional rival with shared sectarian ties. By fighting the Houthis, Saudi Arabia is indirectly confronting Iran, turning what was initially a domestic civil war into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. [9] This intervention transformed the internal Yemen conflict into an internationalized civil war.
In April 2017, another key actor emerged: the Southern Transitional Council (STC). This separatist movement seeks independence for southern Yemen and aims to re-establish the former South Yemen state, which many in the region believe was unfairly absorbed during the 1990 unification. [10][11]The United Arab Emirates supports the STC, a group based in Aden. The STC also seeks to expand its control over resource-rich regions such as Marib, which is known for its oil reserves. This proximity to natural resources has attracted the United Arab Emirates, leading to its collaboration with the STC. However, the Houthis also covet this strategic location, which would represent a major step in their bid for power. [12]
In short, three main actors are fighting for control of Yemen: the Houthis, the internationally recognized government of Hadi (the loyalists), and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks independence for the South. The Saudi-led coalition is fighting to restore President Hadi and counter Iranian influence, turning the conflict into a proxy war. Meanwhile, the STC, backed by the UAE, aims to seize control of the South and secure access to its strategic resources.
Spillover of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
On October 7, 2023, after the Hamas attack on Israel, the Houthis voiced support for the Palestinian cause. This stance reflects their broader ideological alignment with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. These groups are collectively referred to as the Axis of Resistance, which is characterized by strong anti-Israel and anti-Western rhetoric. In Yemen, such discourse resonates with the population due to enduring resentment toward Western involvement. The Houthis capitalize on this to portray themselves as defenders of Yemen’s sovereignty and the broader Arab cause, boosting their domestic legitimacy. [13] This alignment has surfaced in the Red Sea crisis. The Houthis have targeted Israeli and international vessels aiming to disrupt a key global trade route. These attacks form part of a broader strategy to signal their opposition to Western and Israeli influence in the region. As a result, they have heightened regional instability and violated international maritime norms. [14]
In response, Western powers, particularly the U.S. and the UK, have increased their military presence in the region. This has resulted in greater militarization from Western powers, particularly the U.S. and the UK. This escalation poses significant threats to global trade, regional stability, and humanitarian access. [15]
Meanwhile, Yemen’s Internationally Recognized Government remains weak and fragmented. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), which controls parts of the south, lacks coordination with other anti-Houthi forces. This disunity allows the Houthis to expand their influence, especially in strategic areas like Marib and Taiz. [15]
UN Peacebuilding through the Lens of Trust
After ten years of war, one thing is clear: the UN’s peacebuilding efforts in Yemen have taken multiple forms across different contexts and approaches. Since it would be impossible to cover them all, this analysis will focus on the most relevant phases, especially through the lens of trust, which remains the central theme of this overview.
The UN’s involvement began even before the official escalation of the civil war in 2015. As early as 2013, the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), sought to introduce a federal system with six regions, along with a new constitution. This process initially offered a glimpse of hope for stability, as the roadmap was unanimously approved by the participating delegates. [16] The main actors involved the Houthis, southern separatists, and political elites aligned with President Hadi. Following the NDC, Hadi created a special committee that quickly decided on the six-region federal system, a move that exacerbated tensions. It failed to reflect Yemen’s complex political and regional realities. [17] The Houthis perceived the new structure as economically isolating their northern strongholds, southern actors felt politically marginalized, and the broader population experienced a lack of meaningful representation. This exclusion not only deepened existing divides but also eroded trust in the peace process and in the institutions meant to uphold it.
From the outset, the United Nations appeared closely aligned with Hadi’s administration. [17] The UN’s alignment with Hadi undermined its perceived neutrality and, to some extent, its credibility as a peace mediator, especially among Houthi factions. This deepened mutual distrust and made negotiations significantly more difficult. Several factors contributed to the failure of the NDC. These included weak public engagement, limited economic resources, unrealistic timelines, and poor representation. [18] However, a crucial issue that is often overlooked is trust. More precisely, the absence of trust played a central role in the eventual breakdown of the process.
Shortly after the outbreak of the civil war in 2015, the UN affirmed its support for President Hadi’s legitimacy by endorsing UN Security Council Resolution 2216, adopted in April 2015 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution called on the Houthi rebels to withdraw from seized areas, disarm, and recognize Hadi’s government. This formal backing positioned the UN as a partisan actor in the eyes of many Yemenis. It enabled the Hadi government to repeatedly invoke Resolution 2216 to demand full Houthi withdrawal and disarmament, while the Houthis, in turn, rejected Hadi’s legitimacy altogether. [17]
Later, the UN facilitated the Stockholm Agreement in 2018, framing it as a short-term achievement. The agreement aimed to de-escalate the conflict in Hudaydah, a strategic port through which much of Yemen’s humanitarian aid is delivered. The outcome was relatively successful, as the UN managed to bring opposing Yemeni parties to the negotiating table. [19] Similarly, in April 2022, the UN brokered a truce that was held for six months, under the leadership of Special Envoy Hans Grundberg. [20]
From this brief overview of UN peacebuilding efforts, it becomes clear that the UN has been more effective in achieving short-term, clearly defined goals, such as the Hudaydah ceasefire or the 2022 truce, than in fostering a sustainable, long-term peace. While various factors contribute to this limitation, a key issue lies in the UN’s inability to fully account for the regional dimensions of the Yemen conflict. [21] Its early alignment with President Hadi effectively placed it on the side of Saudi Arabia, which compromised its appearance of neutrality. Given the conflict’s broader dynamics, in many ways a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, this alignment eroded trust among local actors, particularly the Houthis, and weakened the UN’s role as an impartial mediator.
Oman as a Trustworthy Peacemaker
The emergence, or re-emergence, of Oman as a key actor in this landscape is particularly noteworthy. Although Oman had long played a behind-the-scenes role, it has stepped into a more visible position since the 2022 truce. Unlike other regional powers, Oman appears to enjoy a higher level of trust and neutrality, positioning itself uniquely as a potential peacemaker. [20]
A milestone in Oman’s peacebuilding efforts came in April 2023, when it successfully hosted negotiations between Saudi and Houthi representatives. After nearly eight years of civil war, this achievement underscored the Omani government credibility as a neutral mediator. These talks sparked cautious optimism among observers that the conflict might be moving toward de-escalation. While no formal agreement was announced, discussions reportedly covered a permanent ceasefire, the withdrawal of Saudi forces, and the reopening of Houthi-controlled ports to allow humanitarian aid delivery. [22]
An illustrative example of Omani diplomacy is its role in the de-escalation of the Red Sea crisis in May 2025, where Oman mediated between the Houthis and the United States. [23] This hopeful breakthrough prompts us to ask why and how Oman has emerged as a credible candidate for facilitating long-term peacebuilding in Yemen.
As already mentioned, one of the key advantages of Oman as a possible peace mediator is the trust it enjoys. The country’s balanced relations with Saudi Arabia, the Houthi movement, Iran, and other Yemeni and international stakeholders have enabled it to mediate in a way that few others can. Oman is widely regarded as a „good friend“ of the region, maintaining cordial and consistent relations with various sides. [24] As noted by observers, “The Houthi leadership places immense trust in Oman as a peacemaker.” Similarly, Iran, the main regional backer of the Houthis, holds a favorable view of Oman and has consistently supported its diplomatic efforts. [25]
This stems from Oman’s reputation as the „Switzerland of the Middle East,“ a title earned through its long-standing policy of neutrality and non-interference, as well as its independence from Saudi influence. [26] Since the beginning of the civil war in Yemen in March 2015, Oman has been the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member state that has not yet joined the Saudi-led military intervention.This intervention aimed to reinstate the ousted Yemeni president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and defeat the Houthi militias. Instead, Oman broke with regional consensus by refusing to intervene militarily and by consistently calling for an immediate end to hostilities. This opposition is far from trivial, as it underscores the Sultanate commitment to diplomacy over the use of force. This stance also strengthened its neutrality and reinforced its role as a diplomatic bridge. [25]
While Saudi Arabia and Iran have restored official diplomatic ties, through mediation facilitated by Oman and China, Riyadh still does not maintain direct official channels of communication with the Houthis themselves. This has made Oman an indispensable backchannel for relaying messages and hosting negotiations between the warring sides. Since Saudi Arabia has no official ties with Iran or the Houthis, Oman has played a crucial role as a backchannel for communication between the warring sides, offering a neutral venue for negotiations. [27] Oman carefully maintains its neutrality by avoiding alignment with any particular faction, while continuing to host representatives from all parties involved in the Yemen conflict, both local and external. This cautious approach enables Oman to act as an indispensable mediator in the ongoing efforts to resolve the conflict. [25]
Finally, Oman is widely perceived as a disinterested actor in the Yemen conflict, meaning it does not pursue any hidden or strategic interests in the country. Unlike other regional powers involved in the war, Oman is not seeking territorial, political, or economic gains. This perception significantly enhances its credibility as a neutral mediator. [28]
That being said, Oman’s role must be viewed with nuance. The Sultanate has a realistic understanding of the Yemen conflict and recognizes the limits of its role as a mediator. It remains aware of the military dynamics in the region and is cautious not to overstep. It cannot compete with the hard power of its neighbors. This includes the vast financial resources of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as the military capabilities of Iran. As a result, Oman’s involvement in Yemen is constrained by a delicate diplomatic balancing act. [25]
Ultimately, any meaningful progress toward ending the conflict depends on Saudi Arabia’s willingness to do so. That political will, to halt hostilities and enter into genuine negotiations, has only recently begun to surface. For Saudi Arabia, prolonging the war no longer appears to serve its interests. The Houthis have proven far more resilient than expected, dragging the Kingdom into a drawn-out and costly conflict. The war is estimated to have cost around $265 billion, undermining Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goals and tarnishing its international image, particularly in light of persistent accusations of serious human rights violations. [29]This emerging willingness from the Kingdom to engage in peace discussions significantly enhances the effectiveness of Oman’s mediation efforts.
Reflection: UN and Oman Complementarity
This reflection examines the contrasting roles of Oman and the UN in the Yemen conflict, highlighting how trust fundamentally shapes peace efforts. Oman enjoys a relatively high degree of trust, largely thanks to its consistent neutrality and non-interference in the Yemen crisis. This stance has allowed it to act as a credible mediator, welcomed by various stakeholders.
In contrast, the United Nations faces challenges to its credibility stemming from the Security Council’s structure, where some member states, such as the United Arab Emirates, have actively participated in the conflict as part of the Saudi-led coalition. This involvement raises legitimate concerns about the impartiality of UN-led initiatives, especially when key members are implicated in the violence. Such dynamics undermine perceptions of neutrality and limit the legitimacy of UN-backed peace efforts. This contrast helps explain why many regional and local actors place greater trust in Oman’s diplomacy. [30]
Oman’s approach to Yemen’s political future is to avoid supporting any specific power-sharing plan. Instead, it promotes a solution that includes all parties inside Yemen as well as outside countries. Oman hopes for a settlement based on national reconciliation, where Yemeni groups agree on how to share power internally, and where both Saudi Arabia and Iran make some compromises. Ideally, this would mean ending the fighting and foreign troops leaving Yemen. Above all, Oman’s main goal is to help create a lasting peace, even if that means considering options like federalism or southern independence. [25]
In this context, the complementarity of Oman and the United Nations becomes particularly valuable. Oman serves as a crucial bridge between regional and international actors, leveraging its trusted diplomacy and access to key stakeholders on all sides. Meanwhile, the UN brings multilateral legitimacy and provides the institutional support and humanitarian access. Together, these two actors embody both the soft power of credible regional mediation and the institutional framework and logistical support necessary for effective peacebuilding.
Article reviewed by Michaela Mildorfová and Veronika Zwiefelhofer Čáslavová
References
[1] World Bank. (2024, October). Yemen faces mounting economic challenges as conflict continues, regional tensions escalate.https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/10/31/yemen-faces-mounting-economic-challenges-as-conflict-continues-regional-tensions-escalate
[2] Nasser, A. (2023, May). The thorny relationship between Yemen’s government and the Southern Transitional Council. Arab Center Washington DC. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-thorny-relationship-between-yemens-government-and-the-southern-transitional-council/
[3] Le Dessous des Cartes. (2020, March 19). Yémen : l’impossible unité ? . Le Dessous des cartes. ARTE. https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/091355-000-A/yemen-l-impossible-unite/
[4] Al Iriani, M., Hassan, H., & Martinez, I. (2020, April). Conflict, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction in Yemen(ERF Working Paper No. 1391). Economic Research Forum. https://erf.org.eg/app/uploads/2020/08/1598526215_108_640022_1391.pdf
[5] Jalal, I. (2023, July). The war next door: Omani foreign policy toward Yemen. Middle East Institute. https://mei.edu/publications/war-next-door-omani-foreign-policy-toward-yemen
[6] Morrison, H. (2024, June 23). The Rise of the Houthis: Transforming Yemen’s Political Landscape. JASON Institute for Peace and Security Studies. https://jasoninstitute.com/the-rise-of-the-houthis-transforming-yemens-political-landscape/
[7] Ziady, H. (2023, December 19). Red Sea crisis: Who are the Houthis and why are they attacking ships?CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/19/middleeast/red-sea-crisis-explainer-houthi-yemen-israel-intl/index.html
[8] Council on Foreign Relations. (2025, March). War in Yemen. Global Conflict Tracker. Retrieved May 5, 2025, from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen [8]
[9] Task & Purpose. (2021, October 14). The Yemen Civil War: Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Proxy Battle [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGtXa8dUH5c
[10] International Crisis Group. (2020, December 15). Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council: A delicate balancing act. Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemens-southern-transitional-council-delicate-balancing-act
[11] Heibach, J. (2021). The future of South Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council (GIGA Focus Middle East No. 2/2021). German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA). https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/the-future-of-south-yemen-and-the-southern-transitional-council
[12] Truzman, J. (2022, January 19). Houthis launch aerial attack against UAE capital Abu Dhabi. FDD’s Long War Journal. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/01/houthis-launch-aerial-attack-against-uae-capital-abu-dhabi.php
[13] Carlson, J. (2024). Houthi motivations driving the Red Sea crisis: Understanding how Ansar Allah’s strategic culture goes beyond Gaza and Iran. Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 15(2), 94–113. https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-15-no-2/Houthi-Motivations-Driving-the-Red-Sea-Crisis/
[14] Geopolitical Monitor. (2025, March 14). Houthis emerge from Red Sea shipping crisis unscathed. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/houthis-emerge-from-red-sea-shipping-crisis-unscathed/
[15] Al Jazeera. (2025, March 12). Yemen’s Houthis to resume shipping attacks over Gaza aid cutoff. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/12/yemens-houthis-to-resume-shipping-attacks-over-gaza-aid-cutoff
[15] International Crisis Group. (n.d.). The Houthis‘ Red Sea Attacks Explained.
[16] Jalal, I. (2022, June 21). Yemen’s incomplete national dialogue: Insights on the design and negotiationsdynamics.YemenPolicyCenter. https://www.yemenpolicy.org/yemens-incomplete-national-dialogue/
[17] Lackner, H. (2020). The role of the United Nations in the Yemen crisis. In S. W. Day & N. Brehony (Eds.), Global, regional, and local dynamics in the Yemen crisis (pp. [insert page range]). Springer InternationalPublishing. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/leidenuniv/detail.action?docID=6039476
[18] Schmitz, C. (2014, February). Yemen’s National Dialogue (MEI Policy Paper 2014-1). Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Charles%20Schmitz%20Policy%20Paper.pdfTowson University
[19] Al-Tamimi, A. A. A., & Venkatesha, U. (January, 2023). Assessment of the United Nations Good Offices for Conflict Resolution in Yemen. Peace and Security Studies. https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2022-0031
[20] United Nations. (2024, July 15). UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg reports progress in Yemen peace talks. UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/07/1152416
[21] Ben Younes, S. (2019). The UN role in restoring peace in the Middle East: The case of Yemen. In Proceedings of the International Middle East Symposium (Chapter 7). Istanbul University. https://doi.org/10.26650/B/SS25.2019.001.07
[22] Al Jazeera English. (2023, May 11). Is the war in Yemen about to end? | Start Here [Video]. YouTube.
[23] France 24. (2025, May 6). Oman announces ceasefire deal between Yemen’s Houthis,US. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250506-oman-announces-ceasefire-deal-between-yemen-s-houthis-us
[24] Baabood, A. (2021, June 7). Omani perspectives on the peace process in Yemen. Berghof Foundation. https://berghof-foundation.org/files/publications/2021_OmaniPerspectivesPeaceProcessYemen_Baabood_EN.pdf
[25] Al-Karimi, K. (2023, January 23). Muscat mediation: Oman’s diplomatic success in Yemen. The New Arab https://www.newarab.com/analysis/muscat-mediation-omans-diplomatic-success-yemen
[26] Worrall, J. (2021). “Switzerland of Arabia”: Omani foreign policy and mediation efforts in the Middle East. The International Spectator, 56(4), 134–150. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2021.1996004:contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
[27] Bodetti, A. (2020, January 7). Oman strives for neutrality in the Middle East. YaleGlobal Online. https://archive-yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/oman-strives-neutrality-middle-east
[28] Al-Karimi, K. (2023, January 23). Muscat mediation: Oman’s diplomatic success in Yemen. The New Arab.https://www.newarab.com/analysis/muscat-mediation-omans-diplomatic-success-yemenThe New Arab+2
[29] Harb, I. K. (2024, août 27). A fragile but enduring truce in Yemen. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies
https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-fragile-but-enduring-truce-in-yemen/
[30] Liberti, S. (2023, Fall). Oman: Navigating peace amidst turmoil. Global Studies Student Projects, Pillars at Taylor University. https://pillars.taylor.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=globalstudies
