Donald Trump’s vocal advocacy for confronting the rising People’s Republic of China, combined with his criticism of America’s role as Europe’s security guarantor, has led him to strongly endorse redirecting U.S. foreign policy from Europe to Asia. However, his signalled unilateral pivot from Europe to Asia risks undermining the U.S. strategic position in the Pacific by alienating allies and driving the EU closer to Beijing. Conversely, a more pragmatic and cooperative approach to Europe could provide the United States with a capable defence partner and free up its resources to address challenges in Asia. 

The American Pivot to Asia

The American pivot to Asia as a foreign policy strategy originated with Barack Obama, “the first Pacific president”. [1] Recognising the rising power and influence of the People’s Republic of China, he assessed that the previous U.S. administrations did not sufficiently address this emerging threat. [2] Obama preferred greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen the U.S. position in the region. Over time, this approach gained broad bipartisan support and was adopted by all subsequent administrations. Nevertheless, critics have argued that this pivot was initially mostly rhetorical and that the policy was not implemented to its full extent, calling the period between 2011 and 2021 the “lost decade”, [2] during which China grew more visible and assertive on the international stage, increasingly challenging the American hegemony. [3]

Several factors impeded the redeployment of American resources to the Indo-Pacific, including an underestimation of the Chinese challenge, the emergence of crises in other regions, the potential consequences of withdrawing from other areas, and the lack of domestic incentives. The shift towards competition with China only became prevalent during Donald Trump’s administration, with American engagement in the region intensifying under President Joe Biden. [4]

After decades of the American focus on the transatlantic partnership, it is not surprising that the European reaction to the “pivot” was not overwhelmingly positive. This response possibly influenced the Obama administration to rebrand the “pivot” as a “rebalancing” to minimise the impression of withdrawal from the old continent. [5] The European Union struggled to formulate and implement a fitting response. One approach involved a pivot of its own, primarily economic, which peaked in 2012 with the signing of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, joining the ASEAN Regional Forum, multiple summits with China, India, and Korea, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit, and more. [5] The second strategy became known as European Strategic Autonomy, which aimed to develop independent European deterrence and defence capabilities while reducing European dependence on U.S. protection. [6]

Differing Policy Interests in Asia

The rising importance of the Indo-Pacific has created friction between Washington and Brussels by diminishing emphasis on the traditional transatlantic bond and pushing Europe towards decreasing its dependence on the United States. Nonetheless, these tensions extend beyond the shifting focus of American attention. The divergent interests in the Indo-Pacific region represent additional challenges. 

The United States is engaged in great power competition with China, [7] focusing on increasing its military presence in the region, strengthening security partnerships, [8] and upholding its explicit [9] and implicit [10] security guarantees. This effort involves collaboration with strategically valuable partners through initiatives such as AUKUS and the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) via military exercises and operations. [11] In the economic sphere, the former Trump administration initiated a trade war with Beijing to reduce the trade deficit and dependence on China. [12] While the Biden administration somewhat softened its rhetoric, it maintained focus on decreasing American reliance on China. [13] Trump’s second administration is expected to adopt an even more confrontational stance on Sino-American trade relations than the first one. [14]

Europe’s position differs significantly. The EU lacks consensus on approaching China and the broader Indo-Pacific region. While some member states are more vocal in their critique of Beijing, [15] others maintain a quieter stance, prioritising trade relations with China instead. [16] Debate continues over whether the EU should engage substantively in the region at all. [17] Although the Union recognises China’s threat potential, it has no direct security stake due to geographic distance. Instead, the EU is more concerned with maintaining the rules-based international order and international law through open multilateralism and diplomacy. Additional key interests include the stability of international markets, economic growth, climate change, and security of supply chains and trade. [18] Overall, the EU pursues pragmatic cooperation with China on multiple issues, including trade and climate change. Yet it remains vocal about others, such as human rights abuses and threats to the rules-based international order. [19] Consequently, this creates frequent tension between the pragmatic, economically focused approach of the EU and the more hawkish, security-oriented stance of the United States.

Trump’s Policy Towards Europe Could Undermine His Policy Towards China

With Trump’s second administration now only settling in, its full policy direction remains uncertain. Historically, Trump has been renowned for his harsh rhetoric, but his executive actions were generally less consistent with his statements. [20] Regardless, based on his speeches, interviews, and cabinet appointments, China appears poised to remain the main priority. [21] Yet this unilateral hard pivot from Europe to Asia risks undermining the US’s strategic position in the Pacific – Trump’s aforementioned foreign policy priority. Three principal consequences of alienating the EU merit consideration.

The increasing drift between the United States and the European Union, especially given the ongoing Russian threat, will only strengthen the already growing European strategic autonomy movement. Its first rise coincided with Trump’s first administration, and further European defence and foreign policy integration can be expected during his second term. Such developments would make the EU less dependent on the United States in many aspects, perhaps most importantly in terms of defence and military procurement. While some American experts have argued for a more credible and self-sufficient Europe [22] to balance the transatlantic alliance, there are also downsides. Reduced European dependence on the American military-industrial complex could decrease its profitability and production capabilities, potentially constraining support for U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, if the “balancing” of the transatlantic bond is a consequence of adversarial rhetoric, it might not only diminish the EU’s will to help U.S. initiatives but also provide it with means not to have to do so. Nowadays, Washington holds a significant influence over Europe through security guarantees; however, the more independent Europe grows, the smaller the American influence will become. 

Second, Europe will be forced to face the Russian threat increasingly alone, as the adversarial rhetoric will make the United States an unreliable partner. This will cause European countries to consolidate and prioritise their resources, which may result in reduced allocation to Indo-Pacific security – the frequency of naval deployments to the region may be decreased. Several EU countries, including Germany, [23] France, [24] the Netherlands, [25] and Italy [26], have deployed naval assets to the Indo-Pacific in recent years for cooperation with partners, naval exercises, or freedom of navigation missions. Although certain deployments are scheduled for 2025, [27] some experts argue that Europe should disengage from Asia. [17] Diminishing confidence in American support against Russia will likely only amplify these calls, and the United States may thus be less likely to receive European assistance in deterring China and building Indo-Pacific partnerships.

Third, the implementation of economic measures against European trade by the Trump administration could drive the EU towards greater accommodation with China to offset the economic impact. Currently, the United States is the EU’s largest trading partner in goods [28], and an imposition of trade barriers could thus intensify the EU’s already comparatively less antagonistic approach to China. Some have even suggested that China’s economy would benefit even without American tariffs on Europe, as European countries might leverage economic ties with China to help finance their increased defence spending required by the U.S. pivot. [29] Moreover, China would likely capitalise on this opportunity to redirect its trade from the United States to Europe to avoid American tariffs. Consequently, in case of an escalation in the Indo-Pacific involving China, the EU might hesitate to oppose Beijing due to larger economic interdependence. This reluctance could then undermine American efforts to contain China.

Constructive Partnership Over Unilateral Pivot

While a more radical foreign policy approach of the second Trump administration remains likely, its final form is still uncertain. Unlike his first administration, which included more Atlanticist and establishment foreign policy figures, his second term appointments suggest a more aggressive position. [30] Yet the arguments outlined here demonstrate that supporting a more cooperative policy towards Europe does not require Atlanticist convictions. Trump’s foreign policy should thus adopt a more pragmatic approach, encouraging increased European defence spending without imposing severe economic or other penalties.

Successfully persuading Europe to provide for its defence while preserving the transatlantic alliance could signal a new era in the partnership. With a more unified and capable, but still allied, Europe to counter Russia, the United States could divert more resources towards the Indo-Pacific. Achieving this would require substantial effort and leadership. The Trump administration would have to convince European nations to create a cohesive European pillar of NATO and increase collective (rather than individual) defence spending to be able to fight together without the United States. Moreover, the American administration would have to acknowledge the European Union and its defence initiatives more seriously and recognise it as a legitimate geopolitical actor. [30] 

If the efforts to make the European side of NATO independent prove insufficient or American resources require faster reallocation to the Pacific, the United States could selectively withdraw those assets that Europe could replace while remaining involved to fill the strategic gaps in European defence. This temporary arrangement would aim to gradually develop an independent European pillar of NATO. Thus, increased collective defence spending and EU cooperation would still be required. 

If confronting China’s rise remains the second Trump administration’s primary foreign policy objective, some level of cooperation with Europe becomes necessary, as tariffs and a unilateral pivot from Europe to Asia risk undermining U.S. efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Such actions would provide China with a large European trade market, weaken the American military-industrial complex, erode the American influence over Europe, and reduce the likelihood of European involvement in the Indo-Pacific. Conversely, a more constructive approach to the transatlantic partnership could have far-reaching benefits for both the American position in Asia and European defence capabilities.

Article reviewed by Veronika Zwiefelhofer Čáslavová and Dávid Dinič

References

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