The increasing access to the Arctic’s major energy resources and shorter shipping routes is drawing growing interest from global powers. Russia, China, the United States, and NATO as an alliance are all expanding their roles in the region, while legal disputes over key routes and rising militarization add to tensions. While physically and economically, the area is opening up to new opportunities, geopolitically it is closing up because of an increasing arms race – and this article explores the driving forces behind this process.
The rapid melting of Arctic sea ice, driven by climate change, is opening new, shorter shipping routes – specifically the Northeast Passage, also known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the Northwest Passage and the Transpolar Sea Route. The new corridors can reduce Asia-Europe transit times by up to 30%, [1] creating many economic opportunities. Shorter routes mean having to use less fuel, and quicker shipping allows companies to allocate ships and crews more efficiently. In addition, travelling through the Arctic can be considered safer in certain aspects, as the longer journey between the same regions involves passing through areas of the Indian Ocean where piracy remains a concern. [2] It is therefore not surprising that this change is not going unnoticed. Since 2013, the Arctic Polar Code area has seen a 40% increase in the number of unique entering ships, with fishing and cargo ships being the most common. [3]
The newly revealed corridors, however, are not the only allure of the Arctic. Roughly 25% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and oil reserves are estimated to lie in this region, 88% of those on Russian territory. Although the long-term structure of Russia’s post-war economy remains uncertain, hydrocarbons have been central to its economic model for decades, [4] and recent policy developments suggest that Moscow continues to see Arctic energy and the NSR as strategically important. [5] Russia’s claim to the NSR is, however, dependent on a specific interpretation of international law, and is thus subject to criticism from many sides. [6]
Who Controls the Arctic Routes?
Some experts say that “whoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new passage of world economics and international strategies”. [7] Be this prediction true or not, control over the newly opened routes, and with it their legal status, is a source of disputes between the actors involved in the region.
Russia, which has the longest Arctic coastline, strongly asserts its authority over the NSR. At present, transit along the route requires official authorization, and all associated logistical support must be arranged through Russian channels, effectively making the corridor not only highly regulated but also politically sensitive. [8]
While before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there was little evidence to support the claim that Russia would be limiting access to the NSR for European states, [8] currently, increased state control and policies like subsidized domestic shipping and stricter regulation of foreign participation further reflect a more inward-looking and protectionist Russian approach to the route. Overall, while the NSR remains central to Russia’s economic and geopolitical strategy, its future as a major global shipping corridor is uncertain, and its development increasingly serves domestic and regional priorities rather than international trade ambitions. [5]
A similar legal ambiguity surrounds the Northwest Passage. Canada claims the passage as internal waters over which it has full sovereignty, meaning it can regulate or even deny transit. In contrast, the United States and several other maritime powers argue that the passage qualifies as an international strait used for navigation between two high seas areas, which would guarantee a right of transit passage that Canada cannot impede. [9]
The disagreement is not merely theoretical – it has led to diplomatic friction and practical policy differences. The United States has historically conducted freedom of navigation operations to reinforce its legal position, and it has consistently rejected Canada’s claim that these are historic internal waters. Russia, on the other hand, directly concerned with its own NSR, supports Canada’s stance. [9] China also has strong practical reasons to support Canada. The Northwest Passage is a remote and dangerous region where Canada is the coastal state best positioned to make shipping safer and more reliable for Chinese companies. More importantly, however, China faces a similar dispute with the United States over the Qiongzhou Strait, which China claims as internal waters. If China were to argue that the Northwest Passage is an international strait, it could undermine its own legal position at home. [10] It has, however, remained ambiguous about its official stance, formally respecting the jurisdiction of Arctic states while underscoring the importance of international law and freedom of navigation as to not undermine its own Polar Silk Road initiative. [9]
Great-Power Competition in the High North
This region does not create political friction only through its economic potential and legal ambiguity, however, as the area is also considerably strategically significant. The shortest routes for Russian bombers and ballistic missiles aimed at the United States pass over the Arctic, and for more than ten years, Russia has been steadily strengthening its military presence there. This has included reopening air bases, testing new weapons, and deploying advanced systems, such as air defence systems, anti-ship missiles and electronic warfare systems. At the same time, Russia’s Northern Fleet, which is comprised of nearly 30 submarines and the world’s largest icebreaker fleet, [11] plays a central role in its military and nuclear deterrence strategy. It enables strategic strike capabilities, the targeting of critical undersea infrastructure, and control over key maritime routes. In a potential conflict with NATO, dominance in this area would be vital for influencing transatlantic supply lines and potentially disrupting the movement of troops from North America to Europe, and although much of Russia’s military capacity is currently tied up in Ukraine, the Arctic remains central to its long-term security thinking, both as a defensive buffer and as a zone where it can project power and control access. [12] [13]
Similarly, China is also steadily expanding its influence in the Arctic as part of broader great power competition with the United States. Although China is not an Arctic state, it views the region as strategically important for access to shipping routes, natural resources, and geopolitical influence. [14] China’s activities in the Arctic, however, unlike Russian ones, can be understood less as direct militarization and more as a mix of economic, diplomatic, scientific, and informational tools that are aimed at gradually expanding its influence and reshaping regional governance rather than using overt military force. At its core, China is targeting Arctic governance structures, especially the Arctic Council (consisting of Canada, The Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States), [15] for example by calling the Council an institution incapable of considering global interests. Instead of directly challenging Arctic states, China works within and around their legal frameworks, promoting alternative norms and partnerships that increase its role as a legitimate stakeholder. [16]
Despite lacking an Arctic coastline, China has built a fleet of icebreakers and ice-capable vessels, along with submarines that could operate in polar conditions. Combined with investments and partnerships, such as cooperation with Arctic states and investing in research, infrastructure, and environmental initiatives, these capabilities increase China’s long-term presence in the Arctic. They can also translate into political influence, especially in smaller Arctic or near-Arctic states, as they can provide them with real economic benefits, which complicates how China’s intentions are perceived. At the same time, China benefits from moments when Western leadership, particularly the United States, appears inconsistent or weakened, allowing it to fill governance gaps and position itself as a stable actor. [14] [16]
The Arctic has also become a growing priority for NATO, specifically its security and defence strategy. Because seven of the eight Arctic states are NATO members, the Alliance sees the region as directly tied to its collective security and stability. In response to Russia’s and China’s activities in the region, NATO is strengthening its deterrence and defence posture in the Arctic. This includes increasing military presence, improving coordination among allies, and ensuring that key sea lines of communication remain open. The Alliance is also investing in new capabilities suited to Arctic conditions, such as surveillance systems, satellites, ice-capable ships, drones, and cold-weather equipment. It has expanded command structures and opened new operational centres to improve awareness and response capabilities. Additionally, NATO conducts regular military exercises in the High North to ensure its forces can operate effectively in extreme environments. A major initiative in improving NATO’s abilities in the region is also the Arctic Sentry, launched in 2026, which increases NATO’s vigilance and integrates Allied activities across the Arctic into a more unified operational approach. [17]
NATO’s activity in the region, however, albeit a reaction to the arms race presented by Russia, may inadvertently cause a rise in the geopolitical tensions between global superpowers. When Finland and Sweden joined NATO in 2022, all Arctic states except Russia became part of the alliance. B. S. Zellen argues that this has strengthened Western unity but simultaneously shattered the cooperative framework that had defined Arctic politics since the end of the Cold War. The region had long been seen as an example of “Arctic exceptionalism”, where geopolitical rivals still managed to collaborate on environmental protection, research, and governance. NATO expansion and the West’s diplomatic boycott of Russia, particularly within the Arctic Council, have disrupted this cooperation. The Arctic is now increasingly divided into opposing blocs, creating what Zellen calls a new “Ice Curtain”. This shift has led to growing militarization, hardened borders, and the suspension of many joint initiatives that once bridged East-West tensions. [18]
The Threat of Escalation
As the world is dealing with many international conflicts, security concerns become relevant even for the Arctic. The war in Ukraine, now prolonged and increasingly complex, raises the possibility that a broader conflict between Russia and NATO could break out and spill into the region. Developments such as long-range strikes inside Russia and even external involvement (e.g. North Korean forces supporting Russia) illustrate how the war could expand geographically, and it is likely that any broader Russia-NATO confrontation would immediately involve northern bases, submarines, air routes and undersea infrastructure. This creates a potential that the Arctic – long insulated from conflict – could become militarized and directly impacted by war. [19]
The threat of great-power conflict affecting the Arctic doesn’t come only from Russia and NATO, however. As countries compete for control over the region, the United States see China’s growing role in the area as a security challenge. In Asia, China has used tactics such as territorial claims, militarization, and restrictions on navigation to expand control. And the pressure on China to access the Arctic is rising – as a country heavily reliant on fishing, it is currently facing growing domestic demand alongside depleted local fish stocks. As fish migrate northward into Arctic waters, it is likely for China to seek access to these new resources, and should it be met with resistance, it is possible that China would eventually use patterns similar to what it used in Asia. U.S. policymakers see this risk as crucial. [14]
The Arctic is transforming from a remote, peripheral region into a central arena of global competition. It is not unreasonable to think that as the relations between the United States and China deteriorate, [20] the Arctic will become one of the main places of collision between the two countries. Similarly, as the war in Ukraine continues and EU-Russia relations remain frozen, it seems that little can be done about the rising tension and accelerating arms race in the Arctic. Cooperation on shared issues, such as environmental protection, is being overshadowed by strategic rivalry, and the Arctic could gradually become an active theatre of confrontation rather than just strategic competition. Without the restoration of talks between all parties involved in the region, we might soon see a transformation of what used to be a zone of cooperation into the field of battle for political influence and possibly even military supremacy.
Reviewed by Dávid Dinič and Martin Machorek
Cover photo: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
Sources
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