On 21 October 2025 the National Diet of Japan elected Sanae Takaichi as the country’s first female prime minister. Quickly, both the public and media dubbed her the “Iron Lady” for her swift and extensive economic and security policy changes. While in principle her agenda is not a radical departure from political tradition, she faces the challenge of leading Japan in arguably the most turbulent period for the international world order since the end of the cold war. Confronting the order’s decline Takaichi is now left with an arduous task of reconciling Japan’s rule-based pacifist identity with an ever-more unstable international sphere. And, as seen by her initial tenure in office, she leaves nothing to chance regarding Japan’s security.
The Japanese stance towards armed conflict and the external pressures that shaped its evolution from the 20th to the 21st century. Indeed, Japan’s initial rejection of war and violent means in the post-war constitution, promulgated on 3 May 1947, seems black and white. Article 9(1) of the Japanese constitution states that Japan’s “people forever renounce war as a sovereign right” as well as violence in resolution of international conflicts. [1] This concept is not unique to Japanese constitutional architecture. For example, Article 14 of France’s Preamble to the Constitution of 27th October 1946 similarly asserts that France “shall undertake no war aimed at conquest.” [2] However, while in France such assertion didn’t contradict the existence of a military in Japan it was only after decades of reinterpretation of Article 9(2) that a so-called self-defense force was created. Similarly, the constitution is one-of-a-kind in the trust it places onto the international system. In fact, the preamble proclaims that the “rules of political morality are universal” while Article 9(1) aspires to an “international peace based on justice and order.” In other words, not only is Japan constrained in the capacity for fighting but its constitution supposes an orderly and fair international system. Stemming from these principles two interconnected dilemmas emerge. Firstly, what extent of armament is justifiable for self-defense reasons without violating the war capacity principle? And secondly, what measures should Japan take to ensure that the very order it aspired to is declining?
Indeed, both have been central questions throughout the evolution of Japanese policy. Triggered by the advent and events of the cold war the nation’s legislature continuously reinterpreted Article 9 to enlarge the breadth of self-defense. In 1954 the self-defense force was established and determined to be constitutionally justifiable. [3] On October 14, 1972, the government of Kakuei Tanaka set clear rules of engagement for the first time in a document titled “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution.” [4] Likewise, during the cold war the US-Japan military partnership strengthened. Yet it reached its most relevant standpoint after war’s end when Japan revised Article V of its Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines for 1997 to pin crises in the “Areas Surrounding Japan” as matters of self-defense. Later interpreting this commitment through the Yanai panel the then PM Shinzo Abe reinterpreted Article 9 to assert that “the use of force may be legitimate in the event of an armed attack against a foreign country that has a close relationship with Japan.” [5] And it is under this legal interpretation of self-defense that Sanae Takaichi assumed her role as Prime Minister.
Takaichi: Becoming Leader in a Turbulent World
And it was already before the beginning of her tenure that the Chinese claims towards Taiwan regained significant prominence. Viewed from a skeptical perspective one can orient themselves using the somewhat controversial Davidson Window. First raised by Admiral Phil Davidson during a 2021 US congressional hearing, the window predicts a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as likely by 2027. [6] While it is unlikely that Takaichi was particularly swayed by these specific claims they underlined an international recognition of the rising security risks posed by China to Japan. And despite not naming China as a direct culprit, it is plausible that Takaichi’s predecessor Fumio Kishida acted on some of these signals when he issued revised 2021 versions of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy and created a brand-new Defense Buildup Program. [7] He likewise significantly increased military spending with a 2023 budget of 7.95 trillion yen (56 billion USD) and a goal of 2% by 2027. [8] However, despite coming from the same party as Kishida, the election of Takaichi marks a step forward for Japan’s defense politics. Dubbed a „Japanese Strong Woman” by Marianne Péron-Doise of the IRIS think-tank the PM represents a shift from moderate to a heavily conservative political stance of the ruling party which is now showing a more iron-clad defense policy. [9]
Adapting to the Changing Nature of War
In her inaugural policy speech on 24 October 2025, Takaichi outlined two major challenges to Japan’s security. Firstly, from a policy perspective, she noted the “historic shifts in the balance of power” and “escalation of geopolitical competition” stemming from China, Russia, and North Korea. [10] While condemning this behavior she also put into question the strength of the international system that Japan long relied on. Secondly, on a strategic level she noted “various changes in the security environment, such as the emergence of new ways of warfare.” [10] This underpinned her speech with a message of rapid adaptability.
In the question of Taiwan, the PM made a ground-breaking statement just 2 weeks after her election into office. In a speech in front of the Diet on November 7, she stated that a “Taiwan contingency” would present a “survival threatening situation for Japan.” [11] While Shinzo Abe previously conveyed the same idea, his statement came in December 2021 after his tenure as Prime Minister. [12] Hence Takaichi is the first leader to directly acknowledge Taiwan’s security importance and indicate that an attack on the island would signify an attack on Japan itself to the displeasure of Chinese officials. [13] This is significant as it concretely grounds the previously abstract “areas surrounding Japan” while also directly confronting China on its claim. While Takaichi later withdrew her statement her action indicated an increasingly realpolitik stance of her government which aims to continuously test China’s red line. In this regard, it is important to note that the PM’s statement, while short-lived, created a diplomatic impasse as Japan is still a signatory to the 1972 Joint Communique where Point 3 asserts that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.” [14] While the communique is a joint non-conventional act and thus is not legally binding under international law, its political rejection would require Japan to reconcile to what extent its security warrants violations of the pacta sunt servanda principle. Hence, despite its withdrawal, the PM’s statement underscores her administration’s resolve at direct diplomatic confrontation with China and reconsideration of Japan’s political commitments towards international law.
Likewise, the Prime Minister ordered an extensive review of Japan’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy doctrines to reflect the evolution of warfare seen in Ukraine. Namely she suggested that attrition tactics, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cyberwarfare posed an increasingly potent threat to Japanese self-defense capabilities. In detail she suggested an increase of stockpiles and augmentation of logistical infrastructure in order to prepare for “force sustainment” which she described as the “ability to continue fighting a war over the long term in terms of ammunition, fuel, and equipment.” [15] Furthermore Takaichi’s administration started pursuing a SHIELD defense system which would both defend against and incorporate unmanned aerial vehicles. Reflecting on Russia’s presence in cyberspace, her administration also introduced extensive counter dis-information and cybersecurity measures. [16] More specifically she aims to reinforce the National Cybersecurity Office’s Cybersecurity strategy in response to the increasing prevalence of cyberattacks “regularly carried out to halt critical infrastructure, interfere in other countries‘ elections and steal sensitive information.” [17] In this instance Takashi’s aim pertains to both the protection of physical infrastructure and Japan’s democratic institutions. Hence, in a broader scope, the PM’s measures accurately respond to new threats emerging in the physical and cyber domains fueling the debate of whether Japan’s new defense policy is merely a result of adaptability or a true abandonment of pacifism. On a political level Takaichi’s push for strategy reformation can most fittingly be framed as a pragmatic response to empirical lessons from current conflicts.
Lastly the PM’s government shortly floated the idea of revising Japan’s three non-nuclear principles when Takaichi considered calling for US nuclear missiles to be stationed in Japan as an absolute guarantee against Chinese nuclear capabilities. [18] Evidently this created backlash within Japanese society which has been subject to US bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and yet some appear to take a more optimistic stance in a world where the “nuclear taboo weakens.” [18] While the three principles were later reaffirmed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara they connect strongly to the question: to what extent must self-defense capabilities be augmented to respond to the fragmentation of the international order? [19] Indeed Takaichi was not the first to raise the idea of going nuclear in response to China. It was in the early 1960s that Eisaku Sato and in the 2000s Shinzo Abe revisited the idea in response to Chinese development of nuclear weapons and the Taiwan crisis respectively. [20] They both argued that should the public sentiment have been in favor, they would have developed nuclear weapons which, for Japan’s “nuclear-latent” economy, would be fully plausible. [21] In this case Takaichi’s indication of nuclear revival, while controversial, is not isolated as it marks a historical chain of thought aimed at defense against the ever-present danger of the Chinese arsenal. Arguably the PM’s ambiguous position in the matter also illustrates the rising fears of Chinese belligerency towards Japan itself in the Japanese strategic doctrine. And while there is unlikely to be nuclear development in the short-term and medium terms the current international political environment might be more conducive to the idea considering the recently expired START treaty and subsequent signals from some European nations about developing their own arsenals.
Economic Policy
The PM’s tenure has likewise been marked by attempts at stimulating Japan’s comparatively stagnant economy. However, in the domain of defense her policies appear to target two birds with one stone. While aiming to stimulate the industry for economic reasons she also envisions the increased strategic need of a self-sufficient, advanced, and extensive defense industry in the case a real conflict arises.
In the domain of Japan’s domestic defense industry, the PM accelerated Kishida’s budgetary policy by promising to bring the defense budget to 2% of the GDP by March 2026; a year earlier than originally envisioned. [22] Building on this Takaichi likewise set forth to update the Defense Buildup Program in direct consultation with key industry players including Yasuhiko Hashimo, the president of Kawasaki, who proclaimed that her „plans are clearer, more concrete and predictability is higher.“ [23] Likewise 2 key Mitsubishi subsidiaries have been awarded large long-term contracts by Takaichi’s government. More specifically Mitsubishi Heavy Industry was tasked with upgrading Japan’s type 12 surface to ship missiles to increase “standoff capability addresses China’s growing naval presence in the East China Sea and Pacific.” [24] Additionally the firm has received a pledge of one billion dollars by 2026 towards its role in the GCAP joint fighter jet program with the UK and Italy. [25] Secondly Mitsubishi Electric was tasked with providing defense systems against drones, missiles, and hypersonic missiles as a part of the SHIELD integrated air and sea defense system introduced by the PM as an expansion of the existing Integrated Air and Missile Defense. [26] Lastly the PM’s government also sent positive signals for IHI Corporation, which produced advanced jet propulsion platforms, and other smaller domestic defense contractors.
While Takaichi’s economic policies were immediately beneficial towards the domestic industry, her emphasis on the loosening of arms exports and brokering of international arms deals indicates the PM’s intention to promote long-term growth in the defense sector. More specifically, her government intends to revise Japan’s 3 principles of arms exports by abolishing the rule that previously limited exports to the rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping domains. [27] Despite the restriction not yet legally lifted, the PM already negotiated an export deal for 11 Migami class frigates to Australia. [28] Furthermore her government is negotiating the export of a Type 03 air defense system to the Philippines. [29] In this context Takaichi’s policies stand to open the Japanese defense sector to the global market. While this change could benefit an expansion of the industry it also warrants an increase in competition where, for example, the Type 03 air defense systems will stand against the American Patriot and Russian S-400 systems. However, as the Japanese defense industry is gaining international prominence many politicians such as Katsuya Okoda, Japan’s former foreign minister, voice their fears over a “risk of forming a military-industrial complex.” [30] This criticism underscores the need for Takaichi’s government to balance the expansion of the industry with Japan’s pacifist principles.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Japan’s evolving defense doctrine represents a pragmatic response to the security situations emerging in its region and globally over time. However, it is only through the realpolitik lens of Sanae Takaichi’s tenure that such mere situations became threats. Indeed, the PM’s term so far marks a significant re-evaluation of Japanese defense policy that now asserts three key points; China is transparently recognized as a security threat; policy is increasingly built on threat realities, often stretching the original constitutional idealism; and a competitive arms industry is an absolute necessity to support deterrence. Overall Takaichi’s approach forces Japan to balance deterrence, legal and identity constraints, and industrial growth in an ever-more unpredictable international order.
Reviewed by Martin Machorek and Dávid Dinič
Cover photo: Wikimedia Commons
References
[1] “The Constitution of Japan.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 3 Nov. 1946, japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.
[2] “Preamble to the Constitution of October 27th, 1946.” Constitutional Council, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/preamble-to-the-constitution-of-october-27th-1946. Accessed 18 Feb. 2026.
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[28] Hellyer, Marcus. “Australia Selects Japan’s Mogami Frigate in $6.5B Deal.” Breaking Defense, 20 Aug. 2025, breakingdefense.com/2025/08/australia-selects-japans-mogami-frigate-in-6-5b-deal/.
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