China has only put out two White Papers on non-proliferation in the past few years, with most of its efforts focused on publishing White Papers related to minorities, territorial claims, and so on. Publishing a White Paper on this topic is thus a strong signal that there may be a new era of arms control on the horizon. This article deals with the question of what China’s reframing of arms control means, who it is intended to constrain, and the potential implications for global safety.
In November 2025, the Chinese State Council Information Office (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室) released a new White Paper related to China’s new arms control policies through its Xinhua agency. [1] The paper is titled China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation in the New Era“, [2] and “新时代的中国军控、裁军与防扩散“ (Xin shidai de Zhongguo junkong, caijun yu fang kuosan), [3] respectively.
The publishing of this White Paper is quite timely, considering the worldwide erosion of legacy arms control regimes, with major powers such as the United States being possible contenders in the new arms race (which can be seen from the large document written by the Heritage Foundation, an influential organisation in the Trump Era, “Project 2025”, that urges the USA to not ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and reject proposals for nuclear disarmament), [4] or Russia, with its suspension of participation in the New START treaty, [5] and lastly, China, that has not joined the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, [6] and thus could be considered a dangerous player on the international scene.
The US-China rivalry, an oft-discussed issue, further complicates the worldwide non-proliferation efforts with their nuclear modernisation plans – to state an example, China has invested 12.5 billion US dollars in 2024 alone in order to catch up to the US, [6] and is estimated to become the US’s nuclear weapons peer in the early to mid-2030s. [7]
This article, however, does not intend to discuss this rivalry, but it aims to position this newly published White Paper as a discursive intervention of sorts, rather than as a technical policy document that the Chinese side wanted to present it as. Its goal is to describe the “puzzle” of China, mentioning arms control more often while expanding and modernising its arsenal. The core question this article poses is “How does China redefine what arms control is, and who it is meant to constrain?”
China itself understands (or tries to present itself to its rivals) arms control and non-proliferation as something that “…[embodies] humanity’s aspiration to turn swords into plowshares and lay down their weapons”. [8] [3] This phrasing shows that China wants to consider arms control a civilisational and moral project instead of a regulatory one, and its phrasing sounds almost aspirational, thus eliminating the “obligation” aspect. The preface also adds another important quote related to China’s self-positioning that can be seen throughout the rest of the paper as well: “China has been and will always be a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development, and a defender of the international order”. [8] [3] This means that China constantly asserts that responsibility is more important than specifying constraints.
Arms Control as a Moral Hierarchy
In order to justify its position on arms control and position itself as a moral compass in the international order, China frames arms control as a moral order structured by inequality. This, according to its claims, means that differentiated obligations are justified, unlike equal rules.
The vocabulary that the White Paper uses is incredibly specific, and it often overuses words related to morality, such as “fairness”, “justice”, “reasonable”, “rational”, “legitimate”, or “common security”. Arms control is thus presented as something of an ethical project rather than a technical one, displacing verification, ceilings and enforcement, making arms control a matter of being morally obliged to act rather than giving things up.
This notion of moral vocabulary replacing technical restraint can be seen in many different quotes, such as this one from Section II.: “[China] is committed to building a new type of international relations characterised by mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation, and working together with other countries to build an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world of lasting peace, universal security, and shared prosperity.” [9] [3] From this quote, we can see that fairness and justice are invoked with no regard to parity or symmetry, and arms control becomes mere ethical posturing, with no numerical limits being mentioned.
Another argument made regarding morality relates to different, or special responsibilities for major powers. There is repeated insistence that states with larger arsenals should bear the main burden. It can be seen in the quote from Section III. 1. (2): “Countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should fulfil their special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament and continue to make drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally binding manner…” [10] [3] This encodes asymmetry into the arms control obligations. China, while being the third largest holder of nuclear weapons in the world, [11] reduces the burden placed on it by other countries by stressing the hierarchical moral order of arms control and making the states with even larger arsenals (the US and Russia) bear the main burden. This explains and legitimises China’s refusal to join nuclear limitation talks and portrays their refusal as principled, as we can see from this part of Section II.: “[China]… opposes political coercion, exceptionalism, and double standards.” [9]
This view of the need for asymmetry can be seen in the next part, related to developmental justice, as well.
Arms Control as Developmental Justice and Sovereignty Protection
The White Paper also stands out due to its use of quasi-progressive language in order to justify China’s keeping its arsenal of weapons.
The language the Paper uses is a Global South-oriented critique of technological inequality and of sovereignty erosion. This can be seen in a part of Section II: “[China] respects the fundamental rights and development needs of all countries and strives to balance non-proliferation and peaceful utilisation.” [9] [3] Arms control is, according to China, subordinated to development, and there is a notion of countries with smaller arsenals being subject to bullying and politicisation at the hands of larger nations. A strong emphasis is placed on various issues, such as peaceful uses of nuclear energy, biotechnology, chemistry, AI, and cyberspace.
There are many phrases used to portray arms control regimes as tools of technological containment. Those can largely be noticed in this quote from Section I. of the Document: “The international non-proliferation regime has suffered from pragmatism and double standards. A handful of countries, driven by a “small yard with high fences” mentality, pursue decoupling, sever industrial and supply chains, and restrict developing countries’ peaceful use of science and technology in the name of non-proliferation.” [12] [3]
The use of terms, such as “small yard with high fences”, “peaceful use”, or “double standards”, shows that China considers arms control something that cannot impede development at any case, and sovereignty and development are elevated above transparency and restriction – despite China claiming to be a pioneer at transparency in Section II. of the same Document. [9] [3]
China thus casts itself as a defender of the rights of developing countries, a provider of public goods, and an opponent of Western gatekeeping, and attempts to put itself outside of the traditional non-proliferation power structure, despite possessing the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world.
Strategic Responsibility With No Symmetry
China makes a claim regarding their position as a strategic actor, stating that it is responsible, while firmly rejecting any notion of symmetrical obligations in relation to deterrence.
China repeatedly asserts that it keeps its nuclear forces at the minimum level that it requires, and does not seek numerical parity at all, ensuring that it can keep growing its nuclear arsenal, so it is proportional to the Chinese population. China mentions minimum deterrence in Section III. 1. (1): “China has always exercised utmost restraint regarding the scale and development of its nuclear weapons.” [10] [3] It doubles down on this and later mentions that China conducted the smallest number of nuclear tests out of all nuclear-weapon states. There are repeated mentions of modernisation (early warning systems, penetration aids, etc.); however, those are in constant tension with the fact that this modernisation is not considered an expansion that requires any sort of constraint. Modernisation and expansion are treated as a non-issue for other countries, despite the explicit rejection of arms racing in Section III. 1. (1): “[China] never has and never will engage in any nuclear arms race with any other country in terms of level of expenditure, quantity, or scale of nuclear weapons.” [10] [3]
No-first-use is considered a substitute for arms control, and functions as the ultimate signal of responsibility of a nation in possession of nuclear weapons, replacing any sort of demands for verification or ceilings. Section III. 1. (1) mentions that its strategy is the most transparent: “…[China] commits to a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons. This is the most practical measure of transparency.” [10] [3] Numerical arms control is thus considered useless, and China will likely seek to ignore it.
China has repeatedly stated that every single country has a different security environment, justifying different approaches to arms control. It considers arms control obligations to be contextual, non-universal, and non-reciprocal. Its claims of moral superiority can ensure that it can ignore ceilings, inspections, or treaties of any kind.
Participation Trophy: Dialogue as an End in Itself
This White Paper puts procedural participation over substantive limitation by doing two main things: putting an emphasis on forums and mechanisms, and voicing China’s aversion towards binding commitments.
China mostly mentions the importance of processes in Section II. of the Paper: “[China] advances international arms control and non-proliferation processes, in a rational, practical and step-by-step manner acceptable to all parties…” [9] [3] There are repeated mentions of various groups, processes, etc., such as UN processes, P5 dialogue, working papers, expert groups, or confidence-building measures. This signals that China considers its participation a significant contribution, despite putting no real effort into non-proliferation itself.
There are also no concrete proposals for any numerical limits, verification regimes, or timelines, just a mention of support of the existing structures in Section II.: “… [China] rejects attempts to replace the UN platform” [9] [3] This is useful for China, as UN-centred multilateralism is now a brake on rapid, binding agreements, and consensus becomes a kind of veto.
Overall, this focus on participation only, and putting no true effort into advancing non-proliferation efforts, is useful, as this legitimises China’s role as a governance leader, and any possible outcomes that could emerge would impose high costs.
2025: A Space Odyssey, or Emerging Domains
Despite seeming not so interested in creating an actual effort resulting in the advancement of non-proliferation, China expands the definition of arms control into completely new domains.
China is now attempting to insert outer space, cyberspace, and AI into the definition of non-proliferation. The outer space is mentioned in Section IV. 1.: “An arms race in outer space constitutes the gravest and most fundamental threat to outer space security. Countering this threat is essential for ensuring peace, stability and sustainability in outer space, and reaching a legally binding instrument on arms control in outer space through negotiation is the fundamental solution.” [13] [3]
As we can see from this excerpt, the solutions China proposes are, again, passive (“negotiation”) and offer no timelines, and there is no way to verify anything. There is also the often-mentioned arms race that China explicitly rejects in writing, but verifiably participates in reality, even in the space domain. [14]
The same arms race language is used similarly in relation to AI as well (in Section IV. 3.): “China does not and will not engage in any AI arms race with other countries; rather it advances its military intelligence and builds its modern military forces with Chinese characteristics in accordance with global military revolution trends…”, (ibid): “China believes that military applications of AI should never undermine humanity’s wellbeing; instead, they should…prevent arms races.” [13] [3] This completely mirrors the language China uses in relation to nuclear non-proliferation and arms races.
The expansion of arms control discourse is strategic. Including issues like AI, cyberspace security, and outer space security dilutes non-proliferation pressures that China might feel regarding nuclear weapons. Leadership in emerging fields such as the aforementioned ones also compensates for resistance in traditional fields.
Conclusion
There are many reasons why the reframing of non-proliferation and arms control in such a way works for China. The first reason is the normative appeal that this presents. The Global South concerns may resonate with many of China’s allies, especially the post-colonial ones, where non-proliferation efforts may sound like echoes of the distant past. The Chinese talking points align with the post-hegemonic rhetoric well.
There is a sort of strategic ambiguity that makes this reframing beneficial for China. The talks of modernisation allow flexibility and avoid being boxed into any Western frameworks.
The last important point is the ideological coherence. China often mentions its own Global Security Initiative (Quanqiu Anquan Changyi 全球安全倡议) in the Paper, which is part of its longstanding Comprehensive National Security framework. [15] There are also mentions of a “community with a shared future” and of “sovereignty-centric governance”, which help position China’s opinions on arms control as morally superior.
Arms control with Chinese characteristics, as China itself often names its non-proliferation strategy, is, as we can see, not about mutual restraint amongst equals, but about moral hierarchy with China at the top, differentiated responsibility, and legitimacy management. This redefinition of arms control by China may, therefore, complicate future arms control efforts, due to China’s participation on completely different terms.
Reviewed by Martin Machorek and Dávid Dinič
Cover photo: President of Russia/Flickr
References
[1] Xinhua. (2025, November 25). China’s arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation in the new era. Retrieved January 19, 2026, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zy/wjzc/202511/t20251127_11761656.html
[2] Xinhua. (2025, November 27). Full text: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era. The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. Retrieved December 30, 2025, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-11/27/content_118198082.html
[3] 新华社. (2025, November 27). 新时代的中国军控、裁军与防扩散. 国务院新闻办公室. Retrieved December 30, 2025, from http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/zfbps_2279/202511/t20251127_940277.html
[4] Roberts, K. D., The Heritage Foundation, Kevin D. Roberts, Paul Dans, & Steven Groves. (2023). Project 2025. In P. Dans & S. Groves (Eds.), Project 2025. https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf
[5] Bugos, S. (2023, March). Russia suspends new START | Arms Control Association. Retrieved December 31, 2025, from https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/russia-suspends-new-start
[6] ICAN. (2025). China. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Retrieved December 31, 2025, from https://www.icanw.org/china
[7] Implications of Chinese nuclear weapons modernization for the United States and regional allies. (2025, December 9). Hudson Institute. Retrieved December 31, 2025, from https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/implications-chinese-nuclear-weapons-modernization-united-states-regional-allies-john-lee
[8] Xinhua. (2025b, November 27). Full text: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era: Preface. The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. Retrieved December 31, 2025, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-11/27/content_118198082_2.html
[9] Xinhua. (2025c, November 27). Full text: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era: II. Position and Policies: China’s Arms Control in the New Era. The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. Retrieved December 31, 2025, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-11/27/content_118198082_4.html
[10] Xinhua. (2025d, November 27). Full text: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era: III. Playing a Constructive Role in International Arms Control. The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. Retrieved December 31, 2025, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-11/27/content_118198082_5.html
[11] ICAN. (2025b). Which countries have nuclear weapons? The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Retrieved December 31, 2025, from https://www.icanw.org/nuclear_arsenals
[12] Xinhua. (2025e, November 27). Full text: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era: I. Grim Realities: International Security and Arms Control. The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. Retrieved December 31, 2025, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-11/27/content_118198082_3.html
[13] Xinhua. (2025f, November 27). Full text: China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era: IV. Leading International Security Governance in Emerging Fields. The State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. Retrieved December 31, 2025, from http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2025-11/27/content_118198082_6.html
[14] Pollpeter, K., Barrett, E., & Herlevi, A. (2025). DETERRING CHINA’S USE OF FORCE IN THE SPACE DOMAIN: A PROPOSED SCORECARD FOR WEIGHING THE RISKS. China Aerospace Studies Institute. Retrieved December 30, 2025, from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Space/2025-05-19%20Deterring%20China’s%20Use%20of%20Force%20in%20Space.pdf
[15] Corff, O. (2018). “Rich Country, Strong Army”: China’s Comprehensive National Security. Federal Academy for Security Policy. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22151
