Taiwan’s energy sector has become heavily dependent on imports from Russia. This dependence threatens Taiwan’s energy security by giving Russia undue economic leverage and creating a vulnerability in the event of conflict with China. This article explores the reasons for Taiwan’s recent reliance on Russia, despite its Western orientation, and outlines the resulting threats to Taiwanese security.
In 2025, Taiwan quietly became the largest importer of Russian naphtha. According to a recent report by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), Taiwan accounted for 20% of total Russian naphtha exports, worth 1.3 billion USD, in the first half of this year. [1] Such a disproportionate reliance on one country as an energy supplier can be dangerous in and of itself. This is particularly true given Taiwan’s high dependence on energy imports (96%), [2] energy vulnerabilities, and naphtha product-dependent high-tech manufacturing-oriented economy. However, depending on Russia, an ally of China, could also make Taiwan newly vulnerable in the event of political pressure or military escalation in the Taiwan Strait.
Geography, Energy, and Politics: What Makes Taiwan Vulnerable
Taiwan is an island. It is thus necessarily isolated, due to its geography, as well as its geopolitical situation. As an island, it can either sustain itself or rely on costly imports by air or sea. It has great potential for renewable energy – wind, hydro, geothermal, and to a lesser extent solar – but this potential has so far not been fulfilled. The efforts to build wind turbines were infamously stymied by local sourcing requirements that put off foreign investors. [3] It appears the Taiwanese government is trying to avoid its past mistakes on the new frontier of geothermal energy – a surprisingly underdeveloped area despite Taiwan’s location in the Ring of Fire, especially in comparison to Japan. This effort faces additional challenges, such as concerns from hot spring resort owners and issues related to indigenous land ownership. [4] While slowly trying to build up investment into renewables, Taiwan is closing off other energy sources. In a heavily debated move (even prompting a national referendum), Taiwan shut down its last operating nuclear power plant in May 2025, [5] following years of campaigning by activists in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. This leaves Taiwan relying on traditional non-renewable energy (oil, gas, coal), but it lacks domestic supply. Thus, when it comes to energy, Taiwan is dependent on supply from abroad – 96% of its energy is imported. [2]
Taiwan’s other set of vulnerabilities comes from its geopolitical situation, particularly its relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Though de-facto operating as an independent economic and political entity, Taiwan is considered a rebellious province by the PRC, which has repeatedly stated its goal of reuniting the island with the mainland. Moreover, although the PRC’s past approach toward Taiwan hinged more on enticing it back through economic cooperation and soft power, [6] in recent years the rhetoric has shifted towards the possibility of taking the island by force. [7] [8] This has been especially pronounced as the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), which was originally founded as a pro-independence party, remains in power in Taiwan. The PRC has underlined its more adversarial position towards Taiwan by holding increasingly more frequent military exercises, plane flyovers, and boat incursions around Taiwan. Besides often coinciding with events related to the DPP’s rule, such as President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration, [9] or international support for Taiwan, such as Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit, [10] these so-called “grey-zone” activities fall outside the threshold of war, [11] while still hinting at the possibility of armed conflict, including simulating an invasion or blockade of the island. [9] These have been accompanied by other similarly borderline activities, targeting critical infrastructure, such as deep-sea cables, [12] with energy infrastructure being the next logical step. The possibility of a conflict with the PRC is thus a real concern for which Taiwan must account in all areas, including energy security.
Russian Naphtha Imports
Taiwan’s extreme reliance on foreign energy imports is a long-term vulnerability; its entanglement with Russian energy is more recent. In the past, Taiwan imported its naphtha – a part of crude oil used in fuel and petrochemical production – from a variety of suppliers, the largest ones being the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India. However, since the start of the Russian war in Ukraine in 2022 and the drop in the prices of Russian naphtha, Taiwan has transitioned away from this model and instead come to heavily rely on Russian naphtha, accounting for around 20% of all Russian naphtha exports. This trend was further increased with the closing of Taiwan’s last nuclear power plant, leading to Taiwan relying even more heavily on fossil fuels for its energy supply. [1]
To fully understand this shift in Taiwanese naphtha imports, it is essential to outline the structure and power dynamics of the petrochemical market in Taiwan. The two key players are the privately-owned Formosa Petrochemical Corporation (FPCC) and the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC), which is state-owned. This difference in governance has led to very different outcomes. The Taiwanese government has in general joined Western countries in imposing sanctions on Russia [13] and put export controls on its high-tech goods, as well as stopping imports of Russian energy (including naphtha and coal) by state-owned companies, including CPC. [14] At the same time, the Taiwanese government has not taken steps to prohibit Russian energy imports by private companies, such as FPCC.
This is significant, given that the FPCC makes up a much larger portion of the market than CPC. [1] In fact, the meteoric rise in imports of Russian naphtha this year has been entirely driven by FPCC, which is responsible for 96% of Taiwan’s Russian naphtha imports since the start of the war, and who has become the single largest buyer of Russian naphtha worldwide. [1] In their own words, the calculation of where to source Taiwan’s energy for the FPCC has been driven primarily by economic considerations – Russian naphtha is simply cheaper than all other options. [14] As neither the Executive Yuan (Taiwan’s government) or the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s parliament) have taken steps to legislate or regulate on this issue, Taiwan’s petrochemical market is thus being strongly shaped by one private company, driven by immediate profit motives rather than long-term security and geopolitical considerations.
Threats to Energy Security: Why Relying on Russia Is a Bad Idea
Leaning too heavily onto one source of supply instead of diversifying inherently carries risks no matter the source. One risk is a supply shock caused by a crisis at the supplier’s location. With Russia, whose petroleum refineries, like all other energy infrastructure, are a logical and critical target of Ukrainian attacks, the risk is not only evident, but imminent. For Taiwan, whose economy focuses so strongly on energy-intensive production of high-tech products like semiconductors – with demand only rising with the growth of AI – the economic impacts could be significant, not to mention impact on the population. Of course, this implicit leverage could also be employed by Russia intentionally, using tactics like strategic delays or re-pricing to exercise economic and political power, such as political concessions or more favorable trade conditions.
Excessive energy reliance on Russia goes beyond simple economic leverage. As CREA’s report notes, there are geopolitical and diplomatic vulnerabilities that being tied to Russian energy (both naphtha and coal) could bring to Taiwan, including damaging Taiwan’s reputation with its Western partners by decreasing the effectiveness of their sanctions, as well as exposing Taiwan to secondary sanctions or tariffs from the US. [1] However, there is a more specific security perspective to be considered here.
Most critically, relying on Russia as a key energy supplier could pose a danger to Taiwan in case of an escalation in the Taiwan Strait. Russia is a known Chinese ally (who has explicitly expressed support for the PRC’s position on Taiwan) [15] and should the PRC decide to act on its more recent threats towards Taiwan, Russia could play an important role. Though discussions of a PRC-Taiwan conflict often revolve around the idea of a full-scale military invasion, the possibility of a blockade or “quarantine”, is increasingly considered by experts to be more likely, at least in the near-term, [16] and it is exactly the one with the greatest relevance to Russia. This scenario involves exerting some form of control over Taiwan’s waters and/or airspace, ranging from a total prohibition of access to all ships and/or aircraft (i.e. a true blockade) and for all goods, to a more selective restriction involving cargo inspection and seizure without fully barring entry (i.e. a blockade). [17] The advantage of this approach over a full-scale invasion is its cost, in monetary terms and in manpower (it requires fewer troops,) as well as in the amount of time needed to prepare it, and its reversibility – not to mention that Taiwan is an island, so inherently more easily isolated.
In case of a quarantine or blockade, the PRC could benefit from cooperation on the side of Russian-owned vessels carrying Russian naphtha. In exchange for, to give an example, increased imports of Russian goods or military support in Ukraine, the PRC might extract a promise from Russia that Russian vessels delay or divert their naphtha deliveries during the period of the blockade, or otherwise comply with any additional checks, restrictions, or seizures imposed during a “quarantine”. In such a situation, the PRC would significantly reduce the amount of armed enforcement it would need to deploy to make the quarantine effective. Taiwan, whose energy reserves are limited and whose domestic energy production, as already outlined, is insufficient, would be left with limited options and might be pressured to make political concessions in exchange for the restoration of shipments.
The Way Forward: Potential Solutions
The first step for Taiwan to improve its energy security is simply to reduce Russian naphtha imports. This could be achieved in a number of ways, such as passing laws to put more import restrictions or to otherwise negotiate with and incentivize the energy companies to diversify their suppliers. It appears the latter is already happening. According to Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs, Kung Ming-Hsin, following talks with both the FPCC and the EU, the FPCC is willing to stop buying Russian naphtha after its existing contracts expire. [18] [19] This is an encouraging step, especially given the previous success of some Taiwanese companies, such as the privately-owned Taiwan Cement Corporation and the state-owned Taipower, in reducing dependence on Russian coal exports, [1] though it stops short of a definitive directive or legal ban on Russian naphtha imports from the Taiwanese government, which NGOs like CREA have been pushing for. There is a potential role here for Taiwan’s Western allies, in supporting Taiwan to find alternative energy pathways – perhaps taking countries like South Korea, which successfully transitioned away from Russian naphtha despite a past dependency, turning to alternative suppliers like the UAE, Qatar, and Algeria, as a model. [1] After all, doing so would help increase the efficacy of sanctions against Russia, as well as enforce the G7’s price cap on Russian oil.
Lastly, there remains the imminently logical option of increasing energy independence through domestic production. As it lacks significant fossil fuel reserves, Taiwan needs to speed up its progress with renewables significantly. Additionally, it may be wise to re-evaluate the closing of the nuclear power plants, at the very least for a transitional period until renewables can replace it, though it could also serve as a steady supply to fall back on in cases of need.
The recent exposure of Taiwan’s dependence on Russian naphtha imports reveals both existing and new vulnerabilities to Taiwan’s energy security, both in times of peace and conflict. It makes it clear that Taiwan needs to strengthen its energy security on multiple fronts, including regulation, markets, and domestic production. Moreover, as proponents of “resilience as deterrence” might argue, building up Taiwan’s energy infrastructure and energy security is not only essential for withstanding or recovering from a potential attack, but it also makes Taiwan a less attractive target.
Article reviewed by Martin Machorek and Dávid Dinič
Cover Image: Russian Oil Tanker „Varzuga“ Northern Dvina River (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
References
[1] Wickenden, L., Levi, I., Sun, H. H., Hsu, M. P., & Slivyak, V. (2025). Dangerous dependence: Taiwan becomes world’s largest importer of Russian naphtha as coal imports persist. In J. Seidman (Ed.), Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air. Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air. Retrieved from Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air website: https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/taiwan-becomes-worlds-largest-importer-of-russian-naphtha/
[2] Simorre, A. (2024). L’approvisionnement énergétique de Taïwan: talon d’Achille de la sécurité nationale. In Institut français des relations internationales. Institut français des relations internationales. Retrieved from Institut français des relations internationales website: https://www.ifri.org/fr/notes/lapprovisionnement-energetique-de-taiwan-talon-dachille-de-la-securite-nationale
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[4] Wang, A. K., Lin, J.-T., & Wang, S.-C. (2025). Social Justice and Indigenous Rights in the Energy Transition: An Examination of Taiwan’s Geothermal Development and International Perspectives. Grassroots Journal of Natural Resources, 8(2), 837–855. https://doi.org/10.33002/nr2581.6853.080239
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[15] Osborn, A., & Trevelyan, M. (2022, February 4). Russia and China proclaim “no limits” partnership to stand up to U.S. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-china-tell-nato-stop-expansion-moscow-backs-beijing-taiwan-2022-02-04/
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[18] Reuters. (2025, October 8). Taiwan says private refiners willing to stop buying Russian naphtha. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/taiwan-says-private-refiners-willing-stop-buying-russian-naphtha-2025-10-08/
[19] Levi, I. (2025, October 16). Statement: Taiwan’s Formosa Petrochemical Corporation (FPCC) agrees not to purchase Russian naphtha after report reveals tremendous import surge – Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. Retrieved October 29, 2025, from Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air website: https://energyandcleanair.org/taiwans-fpcc-agrees-not-to-purchase-russian-naphtha/
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