Over the past decades, states in the eastern wing of NATO have prioritised their defence partnership with the United States, sometimes at the expense of their Western European allies. This trend could most notably be seen in Poland, a leading regional power which maintained this tradition even during the first Trump presidency. [1] From procurement of American systems to collaborative projects and exercises with the United States, Western Europe was always only seen as a secondary security partner for countries such as Poland or the Baltics. [2] Although one might attribute this phenomenon primarily to the overwhelming military capabilities of the United States, another underlying reason should be addressed if Europe is to achieve strategic autonomy. This reason is trust, or lack thereof, within Central and Eastern Europe regarding Western European defence guarantees. In essence, many in Poland and other countries on the eastern flank remain unconvinced, for various reasons, that Western European countries could, or even would, defend the region without American support.

Why Is There a Lack of Trust?

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia emerged as the main security concern for Poland and the Baltic states. However, Western European governments have since massively downsized their militaries and maintained this reduced posture despite numerous demonstrations of Russia’s continued aggressive expansionism, including the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. [3] [4] This was much to the frustration of Poland and the Baltics, which had warned about the threat from the Kremlin for years, only to see Western Europe mostly dismiss their worries while pursuing commercial and political appeasement of Putin. [5]

Following the massive cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007, one of Europe’s most digitalised countries, Estonian authorities identified Russia as the perpetrator. Yet, according to Estonia’s president at the time, they were told by their European NATO allies: “You don’t know what you’re talking about, you’re just being Russophobic.” [5] [6] Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Poland and the Baltic states pushed for harsh sanctions against Russia but were met with unwillingness from their Western European partners. In the words of Sikorski, the then Polish foreign minister: “They were patronising us about our attitude: ‘Oh, you know, you over-nervous, over-sensitive Central Europeans are prejudiced against Russia.’” [5]

By 2020, six years after Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine, most NATO countries fulfilling the alliance’s 2% defence spending target were from Central and Eastern Europe. Between 2014 and 2020, countries like Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary more than doubled their relative defence spending, with another major increase in Romania. In Western Europe, only the United Kingdom and France, two major powers, Greece with its special regional situation, [7] and Norway met or exceeded the 2% target by 2020. No Western state matched the defence spending growth rate of the mentioned Central and Eastern European countries. [8] This data demonstrated to the eastern wing of NATO that others did not take the threat posed by the Kremlin as seriously.

Even after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western European leaders like Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz spent the initial months attempting to negotiate with Putin and avoid any supposed escalation, [9] delaying the supply of vital military assistance to Ukraine. Throughout 2022, Macron still championed ideas that Russia must not be humiliated [10] and must be offered security guarantees. [11] At the same time, governments in Central and Eastern Europe adopted a more adversarial and proactive approach, becoming the first to supply heavy military hardware such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery systems, and helicopters. [12]

Apart from these recent points of contention, underlying historical and cultural issues contribute to the mistrust in specific Central and Eastern European countries. Poland suffered massively during the Second World War after allying with France and the United Kingdom, only to be abandoned to the Soviet Union. France had guaranteed the independence of Czechoslovakia, only to surrender it to Germany at the 1938 Munich Conference in pursuit of peace. These historical experiences have sown doubt in the region and raise questions about whether history could repeat itself, especially given the West’s reluctance to provide weapons to Ukraine to avoid “provoking” Russia [13] and the naive assumption that building an energy dependence on Russia would halt its irredentist ambitions. [14]

Polish foreign minister Sikorski likened the construction of the first Nord Stream gas pipeline – connecting Germany and Russia while bypassing Central and Eastern Europe – to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Nazi Germany and the USSR that led to the partition of Poland. [15] In late 2021, months before the invasion of Ukraine, the head of the foreign affairs committee in Estonia’s parliament remarked, “I hope I’m wrong but I smell ‘Munich’ here”. [16]

In short, Western Europe did not adequately address central and Eastern Europe’s security concerns despite the signs of Russian aggression. It continued downplaying the Russian threat while only reluctantly and moderately increasing defence spending. [17] After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, rather than sending vital military aid, Western Europe engaged in futile attempts at negotiation, giving Russia valuable time to push on with its aggression and leaving Poland and other countries frustrated. These factors, combined with unfavourable historical experiences, seriously undermined confidence in Western Europe’s reliability and competence as a security partner.

Consequences

This reality leads to two trends that undermine the geopolitical position of Western Europe. First, Western Europe’s prolonged lack of attention to the Russian threat and consequent neglect of Central and Eastern European security concerns may have contributed to Euroscepticism in the region. It showed that Western Europe did not share the same priorities and policy objectives as the EU’s eastern wing, making these countries more reluctant to follow its lead. In some instances, Western European governments even directly undermined the security of their eastern allies, as was the case with the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline that was heavily criticised by Poland and the Baltic states for increasing European dependence on Russia. [18] The United States joined in on their criticism, further demonstrating its position as a more reliable defence partner. [19] The people, and by extension their governments, thus may have felt sidelined by Western Europe and viewed European decision-making as misaligned with their interests.

Second, Poland and other regional actors have been pushed to pursue closer relations with the United States, which they so far viewed as a more capable and credible security guarantor. They have been more willing to follow the American lead in NATO and elsewhere and import American weapon systems. Poland alone has recently purchased American-made Abrams main battle tanks, F-35 fighter jets, HIMARS, Patriot air defence systems, attack and utility helicopters, and many other platforms. [20] Poland had also, on numerous occasions, asked for U.S. troops to be permanently stationed on its territory, which was finally agreed upon in July 2022. [21]

In the end, the lack of trust in Western European military capabilities and willingness to use them leads to increased dependence on the United States and a more fragmented Europe. Poland and its allies are compelled to prioritise immediate security concerns over long-term European goals. These outcomes contradict the stated ambitions of many Western European governments to develop European strategic autonomy and lessen the dependence on the United States.

How Can Trust Be Rebuilt?

Rebuilding trust would require a sustained and complex effort. However, it would yield positive outcomes for the European Union and its geopolitical standing. Moreover, external circumstances may facilitate this healing process. The war in Ukraine, for example, has made Western Europe increase its share of the burden regarding defence spending and initiatives. [22] The second Trump presidency is only beginning, but its foreign policy and tariff threats have already brought Europe closer together. [23]

The initial step in the process would be for Western Europe to acknowledge its errors in dismissing the security interests of the eastern wing of the EU. This recognition has already been taken as a result of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both France and Germany have supplied heavy weaponry to the Ukrainian forces, [24] [25] the Nord Stream pipeline is now generally recognised as a strategic mistake, [14] and several Western European countries have even suggested troop deployments to Ukraine. [26] During a speech in Bratislava in 2023, Macron said: “Some told you then that you were missing opportunities to keep quiet – but I believe we sometimes missed opportunities to listen. That time is over, and today, these voices must be all our voices.” [27]

The second step is to build robust military capabilities to deter Russia and reassure Central and Eastern European countries of their security. This requires increasing defence spending. Significant progress has been made in this regard, as 23 NATO states were expected to reach the 2% defence spending target in 2024, [22] compared to just seven in 2022. [17] Nonetheless, that remains insufficient. Western Europe has systematically underinvested in defence for decades, creating a gap in capabilities that cannot be resolved by merely meeting the 2% spending requirement. [28] Western European armed forces must modernise their equipment and invest in new technologies and systems to address strategic capability gaps and establish credible deterrence by denial against Russian aggression. [28] Nonetheless, even with substantial additional funding, a change will not be immediate, as demonstrated by Germany’s 2022 Zeitenwende, an extra €100 billion to the Bundeswehr, and its limited immediate impact. [29]

The third step is to convince Poland, the Baltic states, and other eastern flank nations that Western European states will take decisive action when necessary and will listen to their eastern allies. Progress has been made in this direction, for example, the appointment of Lithuania’s Andrius Kubilius as the first ever EU Commissioner for Defence and Space and Estonia’s Kaja Kallas as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. [30] The new large-scale European rearmament effort following changes in American foreign policy further underlines Europe’s decisiveness. [31]  Nonetheless, much remains to be done. Europe must maintain pressure on Russia by supporting Ukraine. Some have argued that it should also set its own red lines and not let Russia dictate the war’s progression on its terms. [32] To build trust, Western Europe can further strengthen its specific commitments to Central and Eastern Europe, for example, by allocating more resources to the region.

A Capable and United Europe

If Western Europe takes these trust-building measures within the EU’s eastern members, it will greatly strengthen and unify the European Union. Such actions could reduce Euroscepticism by demonstrating the capabilities of Western Europe and amplifying the voice of Central and Eastern Europe in EU decision-making. Moreover, tangible growth in Western European defence capabilities, coupled with a commitment to supporting the eastern flank, would bolster its reputation as a reliable ally. This, in turn, could encourage the eastern wing to support deeper defence integration, such as joint procurement or research and development initiatives. In November 2024, for instance, following two years of trust-building since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU used its budget to support member states in joint defence procurement for the first time. [33]

Together, these developments represent meaningful strides toward improving European strategic autonomy. That would present a significant shift in the balance of power within NATO, creating the long-desired European pillar of the alliance. [34] Tensions could arise as the EU becomes more assertive and American influence on the continent declines due to its diminished status as the primary security guarantor and more independent European defence procurement. On the other hand, rebalanced burden-sharing could neutralise accusations that Europe inadequately funds its defence and foster a more stable partnership between the United States and the European Union. The new arrangement would enable the United States to focus more on countering the People’s Republic of China while a newly rearmed Europe would serve as a deterrent against Russian expansionism. What remains certain is that rebuilding trust within Europe would strengthen its independence, unity, and capabilities, fundamentally redefining the transatlantic relationship.

Article reviewed by Veronika Zwiefelhofer Čáslavová and Dávid Dinič

References

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