The ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has reached a pivotal moment, with recent months witnessing unprecedented military operations and escalating tensions. As Israeli forces target Hezbollah’s infrastructure and leadership, the group retaliates with relentless rocket attacks, raising the stakes for both sides. This article delves into the events reshaping this volatile confrontation, explores the motives driving both actors and evaluates potential future scenarios to provide a clearer understanding of the likely trajectory of this confrontation.
Introduction
The months of September and October 2024 have been crucial in shaping the trajectory of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, marking a significant turning point in one of the most tense and volatile confrontations in the Middle East over the last few decades. A series of critical actions, particularly by Israel, have redefined the nature of the conflict and introduced new dynamics with vast implications. Any further escalation could result in devastating casualties for both Hezbollah and the Israeli military, endanger Israeli and Lebanese civilians across the country, and cause widespread loss of life. Moreover, the conflict risks spilling over into neighboring countries, potentially involving Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen; and the US in a broader regional crisis.
Understanding the developments is essential to anticipate what may unfold in the coming months. This analysis seeks to clarify the dynamics of this crucial dispute and its possible consequences by addressing key questions: How has the pattern of violence evolved in recent months? What objectives are driving Israel and Hezbollah? What are the likely scenarios in the upcoming future?
What Happened in the Last Months?
Hezbollah has been launching missile strikes on northern Israeli territory since October 7th, 2023. For over a year, the fighting has been mostly limited to the Israeli-Lebanese border, however, the current conflict shows no indication of de-escalation. Israel has announced expanded operations targeting Hezbollah’s infrastructure across Lebanon, while Hezbollah continues to fire numerous rockets into Israeli territory. [1]
Indeed, since mid-September 2024, Israel has conducted several operations that have significantly altered the dynamics of the conflict. On September 17th and 18th, Israeli intelligence executed a targeted operation that sabotaged thousands of Hezbollah’s communication devices, including pagers and walkie-talkies. The operation resulted in the detonation of these devices, causing the deaths of dozens of Hezbollah members and injuring thousands more. [2] On September 23, Israeli airstrikes targeted southern and eastern Lebanon, along with the southern suburbs of Beirut. These intense strikes resulted in hundreds of casualties and displaced nearly 1.2 million Lebanese people. [1] Furthermore, on September 27, Israel conducted an airstrike on Hezbollah’s headquarters in Beirut, killing the group’s leader for the past 32 years, Hassan Nasrallah. [3] Israeli media reports that approximately 85 „bunker-buster“ bombs were deployed. These weapons, also referred to as „ground penetration munitions,“ are designed to burrow deep into the ground before detonation and typically weigh between 900 to 1,800 kilograms each. The use of such munitions in densely populated areas is prohibited under the Geneva Convention. [4] These events prompt reflection on the gravity of Israel’s actions, regardless of the intended objectives, which led to a warrant of arrest by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former defence minister Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity and war crimes. [5]
The deaths of Hassan Nasrallah and other senior leaders, resulting from unprecedented attacks on Lebanon and the earlier mass detonation of Hezbollah commanders‘ communication devices, have been a significant victory for Israel, creating the possibility of a power vacuum within the organization, which has, however, been solved by nominating Naim Qassem, long time number two of Nasrallah, as the new secretary-general. [6]
In order to take advantage of this period of setbacks for Hezbollah, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) commenced a ground operation. On October 1, Israeli troops and tanks amassed near the border crossed into southern Lebanon, initiating an invasion that caused significant destruction in border villages but achieved limited territorial gains. Israeli forces are now engaged in direct combat with Hezbollah fighters on the ground, presenting substantial risks for Israeli troops. According to the IDF, several Israeli soldiers have been killed in mortar attacks and ambushes during operations aimed at „eliminating terrorists“ in southern Lebanon. [7] Unlike Gaza’s relatively flat coastal plains, southern Lebanon’s hilly and mountainous terrain poses challenges for tank movement. This can increase the likelihood of ambushes and complicate operational progress, which could potentially protract the conflict. [7] So far, however, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the ground invasion due to limited media coverage and the tactical difficulties faced by the Israeli troops, which have resulted in being “slow” in their advances. [8] [9]
Another set of actions taken by Israeli forces, which raises questions about the legitimacy of their conduct and their standing in the international community, includes the attacks in mid-October on UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) bases. These strikes appear to be aimed at intimidating peacekeeping forces following Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon, with the apparent goal of establishing a buffer zone. [10]
Understanding the Strategic Goals
Whilst Hezbollah’s goals remain the same, thus destroying Israel and driving the US away from the Middle East, Israeli leaders appear to have several key objectives in light of recent developments. The primary aim is to neutralize the threat posed by Hezbollah by significantly degrading its military capabilities and discouraging future aggression. As former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant emphasized, one of Israel’s central goals is to dismantle the military infrastructure Hezbollah has built over the past two decades. The targeted operations mentioned before reflect a strategic shift from traditional deterrence, relying on the threat of retaliation, to a more proactive approach focused on weakening Hezbollah’s ability to respond effectively. [3]
One primary objective is to address the root causes of the invasion, the relentless bombing in southern Lebanon, and the attacks on the UNIFIL base. This is, facilitating the return of more than sixty thousand internally displaced citizens to their homes in northern Israel due to the constant Hezbollah’s missile attacks at the border. [11] Achieving this requires establishing a stable and secure environment, which is currently absent. The recent escalation seems to be underpinned by the Israeli Prime Minister’s statement which claims that resettling civilians is impossible without a „fundamental change in the security situation in the north.” Former Israeli Defense Minister Gallant reinforced this sentiment by saying, „We will continue with additional prepared actions until we achieve our goal, the safe return of northern residents to their homes. To achieve this, we are prepared to take any necessary measures.“ [3]
Future Outlook and Key Scenarios
Israel’s strategic objectives underscore the critical importance of confronting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Following nearly a year of cross-border hostilities, Israel has adopted an offensive stance to secure the safe return of residents in border areas who were displaced by Hezbollah’s attacks.
The escalation of violence in late September marked a significant intensification of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, surpassing all previous phases in intensity. In the 11 months following October 7, 2023, Israel averaged approximately 160 attacks per week. However, this figure surged dramatically in September 2024, with more than 300 strikes recorded during the week of September 15 and over 700 strikes in the week of September 22. [3] Hezbollah, on the other hand, has increased the missile launches, perhaps pressured by the created power vacuum. It launched approximately 150 missiles per week, with peaks of 350 on September 24, and 250 on November 24. [12]
Although Hezbollah has suffered significant short-term setbacks, losing around 80 per cent of its long-range missiles, the group’s long-term capabilities are unlikely to be severely impacted, thanks to the support of Iran. In fact, Hezbollah retains its extensive military arsenal and operational strength, ensuring its resilience despite recent losses. [13] Israel has failed in eliminating short-range rockets, which as long as Hezbollah is able to fire in the north of Israel, impedes Israel’s goal of bringing its people back to their homes. [9]
However, concerns are mounting that this may signal the start of a broader campaign against Hezbollah. The deployment of ground forces into Lebanon, even for a limited incursion, posed substantial risks of a major direct confrontation, which for example, previously happened in a month-long war in 2006. However, Hezbollah is well-equipped with anti-tank missiles and mines and has spent years preparing for such confrontations on its home terrain. Hezbollah has publicly declared its readiness. The group is “prepared for a direct confrontation with enemy forces that dare to enter Lebanese territory, aiming to inflict maximum losses on them.” In addition to these warnings, Hezbollah has launched more rockets and missiles into Israel, which has been described as “only the beginning” of its retaliation for Israel’s ongoing attacks. [7]
Hezbollah serves as a key deterrent for Iran and receives support from militias in Syria and Iraq, as well as the Houthis in Yemen, all of which are components of the Axis of Resistance, providing Hezbollah’s training, weapons, and funding. These groups are actively retaliating against Israel while aiming to prevent a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel. Notwithstanding, recently, Iran has been targeted by Israeli missile strikes and has responded with retaliatory actions on Israeli soil. However, Iran is likely to continue leveraging the Axis of Resistance to engage Israel indirectly. By doing so, it seeks to wage a multifront campaign, persistently undermining Israel’s security over the long term. [14] Before engaging in a direct confrontation with Iran, it is crucial for Israel to dismantle all of Iran’s proxy groups. Confronting Iran directly remains unlikely for Israel to undertake alone, as such a move could possibly lead to U.S. intervention, given its strong support for Israel. [15]
Therefore, Hezbollah’s survival is heavily reliant on Iran. This highlights that Hezbollah has a strong strategic preparedness, both militarily and financially, for prolonged conflict. However, although an all-out war would weaken Hezbollah and Iran as well by consuming its weapons and manpower resources, [16] a few factors made Israel recognize that a prolonged conflict with Hezbollah is currently unsustainable. It is already preoccupied with its operations in Gaza, consistently demonstrating that the IDF is not optimized for guerrilla warfare. The ground invasion proves this since there have not been any significant advancements further stretching its military reserves. [15] Therefore, Israel can keep sustaining the invasion to enable the safe return of its citizens to their homes. Yet, it is not effective and could just lead to a long conflict where there would be no changes. Hence, Israel’s strategy can be characterized as a calculated effort to evaluate the boundaries of engagement with Hezbollah. By intermittently escalating hostilities, Israel assesses Hezbollah’s responses to determine whether such escalations can be incorporated into its operational routine. If Hezbollah’s retaliatory actions remain measured and within anticipated limits, avoiding significant military or civilian casualties or substantial damage to Israeli infrastructure, they are considered sustainable and manageable by Israel. [17] Consequently, if Israel continues its strikes and Hezbollah’s retaliatory actions remain similarly constrained, this dynamic of weakening Hezbollah could represent a significant long-term advantage for Israel.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the recent escalation between Israel and Hezbollah has pushed the conflict to a precarious threshold. Despite suffering significant losses from Israeli strikes, Hezbollah remains a formidable adversary with the capability to defend itself and sustain its operations. The potential for an all-out war looms large and increasingly imminent, due to the tangible involvement of Iran and the US, as also Hezbollah demonstrates resilience in the face of adversity whilst Israel maneuvers carefully to avoid full-scale confrontation.
However, on November 26, a 60-day ceasefire agreement was approved between Israel and Hezbollah, brokered by the US and France. This could build the basis for a lasting ceasefire and hopefully pave the way for the displaced people to come back home without fearing air strikes again. [18]
The likelihood of a full-scale war in the immediate future appears to be diminished, though the volatile nature of the current ceasefire leaves the situation precariously balanced. It remains highly plausible that either Israel or Hezbollah might launch retaliatory strikes, effectively undermining the ceasefire and reigniting hostilities. Should this occur, the conflict is likely to revert to its previous cycle of violence, maintaining the status quo rather than achieving any meaningful progress toward resolution.
Nevertheless, the present ceasefire, though fragile, represents a critical opportunity. If upheld, it could serve as a foundational step toward establishing a framework for a peaceful solution. Sustaining this ceasefire would require concerted efforts from all parties involved, alongside international mediation, to create conditions conducive to long-term stability in the region.
Article reviewed by Michaela Mildorfová and Kryštof Tesař
Sources
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